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Scientific Evidence in the Age of Daubert:
A Proposal For a Dual
Standard of Admissibility in
Civil and Criminal Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
On a September afternoon in 1982, Petti McClellan took her two chil-
dren, Chelsea and Camron, to see their family physician.' At the
doctor's direction, nurse Genene Jones lead young Chelsea to another
room to receive routine "baby shots."2 Shortly after the nurse adminis-
tered the injections, Chelsea suffered a traumatic seizure, ceased
breathing, and died.' San Antonio authorities charged nurse Jones with
murder after discovering high amounts of succinylcholine chloride, a
muscle relaxant, in Chelsea's system and in five other children treated
by her.' Following her conviction and ninety-nine year sentence, Jones
challenged the prosecution's use of a newly developed scientific tech-
nique designed to detect succinylcholine in the body.' In considering
Jones' appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals faced one of the most hotly
debated issues in American jurisprudence, the standard of admissibility
for new and innovative scientific techniques.'
The rapid growth of scientific achievement during this century pres-
ents state and federal courts with the increasingly difficult task of de-
1. Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 144-45.
4. Id. at 145.
5. Id. at 14344. Swedish physician Bo Roland Holmstedt testified to the reliability
of the gas chromatography mass spectrometry test (GCMS). Id. at 145, 14849. Dr.
Holmstedt tested the method for three years before releasing his findings in two
major journals and at four conferences. Id.
6. "Scientific" implies that a particular eidentiary technique is founded on the
procedures and traditions of the scientific method. Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9
F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 1993). Experts testifying to the validity of scientific techniques
are not required to state their opinions with absolute certainty. Id. However, any
assertion or inference put forth by an expert must be derived from the scientific
method and well grounded in what is known. Id.
ciding whether new methods of evidentiary proof merit consideration at
trial.7 The validity and reliability of certain scientific techniques, such
as fingerprinting and x-ray examinations, are so firmly established that
courts may take judicial notice of their accuracy.' However, apart from
such judicially noticable matters, there exists a broad range of scientific
data that can neither be accepted nor rejected out of hand.'
"[P]olygraphs, voiceprints, neutron activation analysis, gunshot residue
tests, bitemark impressions, and 'truth serum' tests""' are among the
techniques considered by courts within recent years."
American jurisdictions are divided between two dominant and com-
peting approaches which establish the foundational requirements for
7. See John W. Osborne, Note, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 497; see also Jason D. Altman, Comment, Admis-
sibility of Forensic DNA Profiling Evidence: A Movenent Away From Frye v. United
States and a Step Toward the Federal Rides of Evidence: United States v. Jakobetz,
44 WAsti. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 211 (1993).
8. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 249 (1987); see Reed v. State. 391 A.2d
364, 380 (Md. 1978); see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786. 799-800 (2d
Cir.) (stating that in the future courts may take judicial notice of DNA fingerprinting
and other techniques employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
Judicial notice of an evidentiary technique is appropriate when it is so widely
accepted that it has reached the level of scientific law. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 n.ll (1993).
9. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 249. Evidence is properly the subject of judicial notice
when the facts are: "(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
10. Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). For an excellent
discussion of the admissibility of voice spectroscopy evidence, see Ronda Bessner,
The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Techniques in Criminal Trials: Voice Spectros-
copy, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 294 (1988). For an in-depth study of DNA fingerprinting evidence,
see Rene J. Herrera & Martin L. Tracey, Jr., DNA Finger7printing: Basic Techniques,
Problems, and Solutions, 20 J. CalM. JUST. 237 (1992).
11. Computer simulations are an excellent example of the increasingly technical
and useful evidentiary techniques recently employed by state and federal litigators.
Lory D. Warton, Comment, Litigators Byte the Apple: Utilizing Computer-Generated
Evidence at Trial, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 731, 742 (1989). The probative value of the
computer simulation depends on whether it is an accurate and reliable representation
of real-world conditions. Id. at 737. Courts have not yet reached a consensus on the
accuracy of computer-generated evidence. Id. at 242-43. See also Datskow v. Teledyne
Continental Motors Aircraft. Prod., 826 F. Supp. 677, 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
computer-generated video reenactment admissible where cautionary instruction warned
jurors not to assign it undue weight); Anne B. Gesalman, The Digital Lawsuit; Com-
puter-generated Graphics and Videotaped Reenactments are Helping Lawyers Win
Big Money Injury Cases; How Far Can They Go?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19,
1993, at 8; Michael Hoenig, Computer Simulations and Other Weapons, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
8, 1993, at 3 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of computer-generated evidence
in the modern courtroom).
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the admission of innovative scientific techniques.'2 In the early 1920s, a
"conservative" test for the admissibility of scientific evidence evolved
from the landmark decision of Frye v. United States.'" Frye quickly
emerged as the standard by which nearly all American courts deter-
mined the admissibility of new scientific techniques." However, follow-
ing the introduction of Frye, many jurisdictions began to adopt a more
liberal test."I
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 intensified
the debate over the correct standard of admissibility in the federal
court system. " The Federal Rules of Evidence clearly embodied a "lib-
eral" admissibility standard. 7 Despite the emergence of the "liberal"
federal test, however, several circuits continued to adhere to Frye." Fi-
nally, in June of 1993, the United States Supreme Court resolved the
conflict among the circuits in the landmark case of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'" In Daubert, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated the Frye test for use in the federal system."0
This Comment examines the history of the admissibility of scientific
evidence at trial and the conflicts created under the Frye standard.'
Next this Comment discusses the impact of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on the foundational requirements necessary to
admit scientific evidence in federal courts." This Comment argues that
the traditional Frye rule should apply to all scientific evidence proffered
12. Altman, supra note 7, at 214.
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 250 (1987).
15. Id. The academic debate over the ideal standard of admissibility for scientific
evidence has been so intense since the introduction of the Fr-ye test that those who
participate in it are often referred to as "Fryeologists." Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2786, 2793 n.4 (1993).
16. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992).
17. William D. Quarles, High Court States Flexible Standard Jbr the Admission of
Expert Testimony, 7 INSIDE LITIG. 16 (Aug. 1993).
18. Id.; see United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 817 (1987); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815, 817 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Alexan-
der, 526 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1975).
19. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
20. Id. at 2792-93. The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded
all common law evidentiary guidelines. Id. at 2794.
21. See infra notes 26-124 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 125-201 and accompanying text.
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in civil cases and by the prosecution in criminal matters. ' Finally, this
Comment sets forth that, in order to satisfy the mandates of the United
States Constitution, a liberal standard of admissibility must apply for
criminal defendants in all state and federal criminal proceedings."' The
tremendous impact of expert testimony on scientific techniques in the
modern courtroom calls for a reliable, economical, and constitutional
solution to the issue.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Frye v. United States: The "General Acceptance" Standard
In Frye v. United States,2' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia set the standard by which novel scientific evidence may be
admitted in federal courts. In Frye, the appellant 7 argued that the dis-
trict court erred in disallowing the testimony of an expert witness re-
garding the results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test."' In
deciding the admissibility of the blood pressure test, the court acknowl-
edged that the precise point at which "a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define."' The court declared that the scientific evidence
"from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
23. See infra notes 202-27 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 228-99 and accompanying text.
25. Paul C. Giannelli, The Twenty-First Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Sci-
eMtific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 137 MIL. L. REV. 167, 167 (1992).
Scientific evidence in the modern courtroom has become the centerpiece of a
number of highly publicized trials in recent years. Id. Noteworthy cases include the
conviction of serial murderer Ted Bundy by the use of hypnotically refreshed testimo-
ny and bitemark evidence, the conviction of Wayne Williams for the murder of thirty
Atlanta children based on fiber evidence recovered at the crime scenes, and the con-
viction of Los Angeles "Night Stalker" Richard Ramirez by the utilization of shoeprint,
ballistics, and fingerprint evidence. Id. at 167-68.
26. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
27. James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of second-degree murder. Id. at 1013.
28. Id. The test "asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emo-
tions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by
nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system."
Id. Advocates of the test claimed "that conscious deception or falsehood . . . accom-
panied by fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic
blood pressure . . . ." Id. The systolic blood pressure deception test was a forerunner
of the modern "lie-detector test." Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 888, 892-93 (Colo.
1993) (holding that DNA typing evidence was properly admitted under Frye).
29. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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longs.""' Frye remained the dominant test for the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence for over fifty years."
The Frye doctrine emerged from a period in American jurisprudence
during which the courts looked with skepticism on the accuracy of
scientific evidence.' The "general acceptance" standard advanced by
Frye ensured that qualified individuals from a particular scientific field
would make the final determination on the appropriateness of a partic-
ular scientific method of proof.' Those individuals capable of testify-
ing as to the validity of a technique must possess the education and
experience in a scientific field to enable them "to comprehend and un-
derstand the process and form a judgment about it. '"" In addition, the
rule provided a reserve of experts capable of testifying at trial.;'
The Frye court sought to prevent unreliable evidence from being
entered at trial."' Proponents of the test argue that the rule promotes
efficiency and uniformity in the judicial system?7 Jurisdictions favoring
Frye argue that it bypasses lengthy hearings on the accuracy and reli-
ability of novel techniques. Those advocating the conservative test'
are comfortable with a high standard of admissibility for fear that a lay
jury might assign undue weight to expert testimony based upon ques-
30. Id.
31. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233-34 (3rd Cir. 1985).
32. See Osborne, supra note 7, at 497-99.
33. United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that psychol-
ogists and psychiatrists comprised the appropriate scientific community to evaluate
evidence of a pathological gambling disorder).
Frye necessitates "a survey and categorization of the subjective views of a num-
ber of scientists, assuring thereby a reserve of experts available to testify." United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979).
34. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978).
35. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
36. Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 889 (Colo. 1993).
37. Id. "[TIhe Frye test ... spares courts from the time-consuming and difficult
task of repeatedly assessing the validity of innovative scientific techniques." Id. See
Osborne. supra note 7, at 501.
However, the "general acceptance" inquiry is not always as time efficient as its
proponents argue. One federal magistrate in the Sixth Circuit conducted a six-week
"general acceptance" inquiry into the appropriateness of FBI methods for DNA evalua-
tion. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 551-52 (6th Cir. 1993).
38. Edward A. Firestone & Phil Haworth, Th7e Admissibility of Scientific Evidence:
A Perspective on Toric Tort Litigation, LITIGATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE
(Sept.-Oct. 1992).
39. See, e.g., Fishback, 851 P.2d at 889.
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tionable scientific theories."' In Reed v. State,4 the Maryland court of
appeal expressed this concern, stating that Frye prevents jurors from
the "misleading aura of certainty" which attaches to new scientific tech-
niques.
Jurisdictions that apply the Frye approach claim that it benefits both
parties in either a criminal or civil action."' They argue that the mini-
mal screening process in Frye enhances the truth-finding function of
the adversarial process.4 Implicit in a "general acceptance" test is a
guarantee that numerous experts exist who endorse the technique and
will be able to testify accordingly at trial."' Advocates of this tradition-
al test argue that when a party advances scientific evidence to further
its position, Frye increases the likelihood that the opposing party's
rebuttal expert is equally knowledgeable in the intricacies of a particu-
lar field."'
Advocates of Frye assert that the "general acceptance" test avoids
unnecessary and time-consuming litigation over collateral issues at
trial."' They argue that Frye leads to uniformity among the courts be-
cause only those techniques that have acquired general acceptance in
the scientific community will be recognized."' These proponents argue
40. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978). "Lay jurors tend to give consider-
able weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with impressive cre-
dentials." Id. (citing People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31 (1976)); see also Bessner, su-
pra note 10, at 294.
For a close look at the intricacies of the American jury system, see VALERIE P.
HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING TIlE JURY (1986); REID HASTIE ET. AL., INSIDE TIlE JURY
(1983); CIIARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND TIlE JURY (1977); LLOYD E. MOORE. TIE
JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY (2d ed. 1988); RITA J. SIMON, TIlE JURY:
ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980).
41. 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978).
42. Id. at 370 (quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32 (1976)). In the course of
rejecting the admissibility of voiceprint testimony, "scientific proof may in some in-
stances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury." United States
v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. Addison, 498 F.2d at 744.
44. Id. Supporters of Frye place greater faith in the ability of a coalition of sci-
entists to decide whether a technique is reliable and trustworthy than in a trial judge.
Bessner, supra note 10, at 303-04.
45. Bessner, supra note 10, at 303; see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1985).
46. Bessner, supra note 10, at 304.
47. Id. at 303.
48. Id. at 304. "Individual judges whose particular conclusions may differ regarding
the reliability of the particular scientific evidence may discover substantial agreement
and consensus in the scientific community." Philip H. Dixon, Note, Frye Standard of
"General Acceptance" for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Rejected in Favor of
Balancing Test, 64 CORN. L. REV. 875, 884 (1979). In essence, specialists in a given
scientific field constitute a "technical jury" for determining the admissibility of a nov-
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that without Frye, a relaxed relevancy standard leads to a scenario in
which one jury might find a scientific method to be reliable while an-
other jury might find it untrustworthy."
B. Criticisms of Frye
Despite its broad acceptance in both state and federal courts, the
Frye doctrine has been the target of considerable criticism.' This criti-
cism has intensified over the last two decades."
The main criticism of Frye is that the test unduly obstructs the con-
sideration of reliable evidence during the lengthy period of time neces-
sary for a technique to gain "general acceptance."' 2 In the 1978 case of
United States v. Williams, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued
one of the strongest criticisms of Frye to date.' Writing for the Sec-
ond Circuit, Chief Judge Markey stated that "[a] determination of reli-
ability cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting scientific noses.""
Courts are often frustrated by the lack of consensus in the scientific
community and the correspondingly slow pace at which a majority
coalition is built.5
A second criticism focuses on the inconsistent results Frye some-
times produces.' Many courts view the test as "vague" and "mallea-
ble"7 in that many jurisdictions apply it in a highly selective manner.'
In United States v. Downing, the Third Circuit stated: "[T]he vague
terms included in the standard have allowed courts to manipulate the
parameters of the relevant 'scientific community' and the level of agree-
ment needed for 'general acceptance."'" The underlying reason for such
el technique. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235.
49. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371 (Md. 1978).
50. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 250 (1987).
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
52. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 250; see also United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53
(E.D. Pa. 1974). But see Reed, 391 A.2d at 370 (arguing the merits of the conserva-
tive Frye rule). See also Bessner, supra note 10, at 303-04.
53. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
54. Id. at 1198. In Williams, 10 scientists favored the admissibility of voice spec-
trographic analysis and 17 opposed its use in court. Id. The court found that scien-
tists with previous experience in spectrography were most likely to accept its validi-
ty. Id.
55. Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
56. Quarles, supra note 17, at 17.
57. Id.
58. Osborne, supra note 7, at 498, 502.
59. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985). In Williams,
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selectivity is perhaps the differing definitions applied to the term "scien-
tific. ,,,"
Finally, before Daubert, several federal courts took the position that
Congress supplanted the common law rules of evidence by promulgat-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence.' Federal jurists taking this position
viewed Frye as inconsistent with the policy goals underlying the liberal
Federal Rules of Evidence.' The Federal Rules place substantial confi-
dence in the ability of a jury to reach a just and equitable result without
a heightened evidentiary screening process."' Courts following the Fed-
eral Rules have held that relevant scientific evidence shall be admissible
in the absence of unfair prejudice and jury confusion, and inquiries as
to the validity of such evidence shall be addressed on cross-examina-
tion."' Proponents of the liberal standard do not subscribe to the view
that jurors attach excessive weight to evidence derived from the scien-
tific process."
C. Variations of the Frye Rule
Courts and scholars alike have skillfully argued for modifications of
the Frye rule."' One approach argues that, rather than applying a "gen-
eral acceptance" standard, a court might require the proponent to meet
a less rigorous burden, such as "reasonable" or "substantial" acceptance
in the relevant scientific community."7 Another approach limits the ap-
Judge Markey commented on the spectrograms as an example of the inability of the
scientific community to reach a consensus as to the validity of a scientific technique.
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978). "In testing for admissi-
bility of a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pat-
tern may be, the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibility
for determining the reliability of that evidence." Id.
60. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
61. See, e.g., Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236-37.
62. Id. "(Tlhe general acceptance standard reflects a conservative approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if not the precise
language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. at 1237.
63. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), "preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissi-
bility of evidence shall be determined by the court . . . ." FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
64. Jones v. State. 716 S.W.2d 142, 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
65. Bessner, supra note 10, at 306. In a survey involving voice spectrographic
analysis, jurors frequently acquitted the accused even though they were provided with
voiceprint evidence that identified the accused as the person who committed the
crime. Id. One case study concluded that prosecutors were 11% less likely to obtain
a conviction with voice spectrographic analysis than without. Id.
66. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1124, 1233 (3d Cir. 1985); see also
KENNETII S. BRIOUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (John W. Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992).
67. STEPIIEN SALTZBURG & KENNETH REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
1398
[Vol. 21: 1391, 19941 Daubert
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
plication of Frye to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admis-
sibility."
Some courts have rejected the Frye and Federal Rules standards
altogether in favor of the approach taken in United States v.
Downing." The Downing court reasoned from the premise that Frye
contained "serious flaws."' It resolved the admissibility question by
focusing on "reliability, relevancy and the dangers of prejudice and con-
fusion."'" Downing is essentially a compromise between Frye's conser-
vative test and the liberal standard embodied in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'
Many scholars prefer the Downing approach because of its reliability
requirement,"' stressing flexibility as an alternative to Frye's "scientific
.nose-counting.'' 7 Downing's "reliability assessment" contemplated, but
did not require the court to consider, a technique's level of acceptance
within its respective scientific community. ' Thus, a scientific tech-
nique lacking a proven "track record" could still be admitted if other
factors indicated a sufficient level of reliability.70
452 (3d ed. 1982).
68. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 153 (citing People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App.
1975) and Jenkins v. State, 274 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. App. 1980)).
69. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985). Downing sought to introduce expert testimony
on the unreliability of lay witness identification. Id. at 1228.
70. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
71. Id.; see Firestone & Haworth, supra note 38. at 5 (citing Downing, 753 F.2d at
1237); see aLso Osborne, supra note 7, at 497.
72. Firestone & Haworth, supra note 38, at 5.
73. Id.
74. Dowaning, 753 F.2d at 1238.
75. Id. at 1238. However, Judge Becker acknowledged that a method's degree of
acceptance within the appropriate scientific community often would be determinative.
Id.
76. Id. For example, an expert witness with unusually impressive credentials and
expertise who advocates a novel scientific technique lends circumstantial support to
the reliability of the process. Id. at 1239.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Daubert noted Downing's emphasis on reli-
ability four times in announcing the federal standard for the admissibility of novel
scientific techniques. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2795-97 (1993); see also James Brosnahan & Carl Loewenson, Eatpert Testimony Con-
cening Eyewitness Identification, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1993, at 1.
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D. The Promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence intensified the debate
and the criticism of Frye.77 While some courts have read the Federal
Rules of Evidence as an outright rejection of Frye,T' other circuits have
held it to be compatible with the Federal Rules.7' Essentially, the Fed-
eral Rules allow the admission of relevant scientific evidence if its pro-
bative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Thus, the promulgators
of the Federal Rules of Evidence implemented a "helpfulness" standard,
so to speak, in which any evidence that would assist the trier of fact in
determining a fact in issue would be admitted subject to the concerns
of prejudice, confusion and unnecessary delay.8'
Courts applying the Federal Rules adhere to Rule 702, which states:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert ... may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. '8 2 The trial judge determines the helpfulness
77. Broun, supra note 66, at § 203.
78. Jones v State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 153 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); see also United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Dorfman, 532 F.
Supp. 1118, 1134-35 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
79. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 250 (1987).
80. Id. Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
Act of Congress. by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
FED. R. EVID. 402.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED.
R. E\'ID. 403.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
In federal court, the district court is allotted "broad discretion" in determining
the relevance and admissibility of evidence. United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 248
(6th Cir. 1991).
81. Quarles, supra note 17, at 2.
82. FED. R. EVID. 702; see Porter v. Whitehall Lab.. 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (ap-
plying Rule 702 to determine admissibility of expert testimony with regard to scientif-
ic evidence).
[Tihe expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified
by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.' Thus, within the
scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g.
physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes
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of a particular scientific technique to the trier of fact by his "own expe-
rience, his general knowledge, and his understanding of human conduct
and motivation."' Proponents argue that Rule 702 pragmatically ad-
dresses whether evidence will assist the trier of fact and discards the
formal procedures of Frye.' Under the Federal Rules, the trial judge
may exercise a considerable degree of personal judgement in ruling on
the admissibility of evidentiary items or expert opinion testimony. '
The Frye "general acceptance" test conflicts with the underlying in-
tent of the Federal Rules to relax existing barriers to expert opinion
testimony.' The Federal Rules depend on the traditional adversarial
process to ferret out truth in the courtroom. 7 Once the judge deter-
mines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential
prejudicial or misleading effect, the jury then assesses the validity and
reliability of the scientific evidence.'
Critics of the Federal Rules, in addition to raising the arguments set
forth in Frye, argue that the relevance approach of the Federal Rules
unfairly shifts the burden of proof to the party opposing admissibility.'
Under Frye, the party offering novel scientific evidence must demon-
strate the general acceptance of the scientific technique prior to admis-
sibility.' However, once the probative value is established, the Federal
Rules essentially force the party opposing admissibility to prove that
called 'skilled witnesses', such as bankers or landowners testifying to land
values.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
83. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 251 (1987) (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE 544 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)). Pursuant to rule 104(a), a judge must make
a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of the evidence in question. FED.
R. EVID. 104. Thus, the judge must make an initial determination of whether the tech-
nique is relevant to the case at hand and scientifically valid. Id.
84. Quarles, supra note 17, at 2.
85. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 251 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 544 (E. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984)).
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993)
(stating that the strict "general acceptance" test is incompatible with the liberal spirit
of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
87. Fundamental to the Anglo-Saxon system of justice is the notion that truth and
fairness result from an adversarial process that challenges the accuracy and biases of
witnesses. THlE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 237-38 (Stuart S. Nagel ed. 1972).
88. Bessner, supra note 10, at 312.
89. Id. at 313.
90. Id.
the evidence will confuse or mislead the jury.' Thus, some critics ar-
gue, under the Federal Rules' relevancy approach the opposing party
undergoes a heavy financial burden that does not exist under a "general
acceptance" test.'
E. Frequently Used Scientific Techniques in the Modern Courtroom
1. DNA Fingerprinting"
DNA fingerprinting involves the identification of unique genetic char-
acteristics through the use of a specialized scientific process.' This
process developed from the scientific discovery that, with the exception
of identical twins, no two human beings possess the same genetic
code.' DNA evidence is particularly appealing to law enforcement per-
sonnel because of its precise "ability to exclude and identify sus-
pects."'2 Despite recent challenges to its reliability, the use of DNA evi-
dence in the courtroom is increasing dramatically."
The process begins by collecting tissue samples from the crime
scene.' Minuscule specimens of blood, hair, semen, and skin frequent-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. DNA stands for Deoxyribonucleic acid. Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
440, 441 n.1 (Mass. 1991). Some jurisdictions refer to DNA fingerprinting as "DNA
typing," "DNA profiling," "DNA printing," "DNA identification," or "forensic DNA test-
ing." Altman, supra note 7, at 212 n.3.
94. Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 885 (Colo. 1993). Each cell within a particu-
lar human body contains an identical molecular code with the exception of red blood
cells, sperm and eggs. Herrera & Tracey, supra note 10, at 238.
95. Fishback, 851 P.2d at 885. DNA is the active material in the genes that exists
in 23 pairs of chromosomes. Half of the chromosomes in each pair are inherited
from each parent. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Minn. App. 1993).
96. Herrera & Tracey, supra note 10, at 237. According to Rene Herrera and Mar-
tin Tracey, "[t]he day is rapidly approaching when a criminal who cannot leave a
scrupulously clean crime scene might be advised just to sit and wait for the police."
Id. at 238.
97. Id. at 237. The value of DNA is evidenced by its use in sexual assault cases.
In one case, while investigating the brutal rape and murder of a woman, laboratory
technicians successfully matched the suspect's DNA with DNA extracted from the
semen of a condom found next to the victim. DNA evidence provides criminal inves-
tigators with a much more accurate means of identifying the perpetrators of sexual
assault than prior techniques such as "AOB blood grouping." Masamitsu Honma, et
al., Individual Identification from Semen by the Deonjribonucleic Acid (DNA) Fin-
geir-pnt Technique, 34 J. FORENSIC Sc. 222, 222 (1989).
98. Herrera & Tracey, supra note 10, at 238. "Due to the chemically stable nature
of the molecule DNA [investigators] can recover DNA years after the cells have
died." Id. DNA fingerprinting takes a laboratory six weeks and requires $100 worth of
materials. Three commercial laboratories (Cellmark, Lifecodes, and Cetus), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and approximately 40 state and local crime laboratories per-
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ly provide police with the DNA necessary to build a criminal case.'
Laboratory technicians cut and separate the samples with enzymes,
localize specific subsets of DNA fragments with a special probe, and
then identify matches and mismatches."' Finally, the statistical proba-
bility of a specific match occurring is calculated.'
Although the theory underlying DNA fingerprinting has gained near
universal acceptance, t2 concerns persist over quality control and inter-
pretations of DNA test results."' Despite recent disagreements in the
form the technique. DNA Evidence Finding Stricter Scrutiny, New Uses, TRIAL, April
1993, at 15 (April 1993) [hereinafter New Uses].
99. New Uses, supra note 98, at 15.
100. Herrera & Tracey, supra note 10, at 238. The FBI DNA fingerprinting proce-
dure is known as Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis (RFLP). State
v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Minn. App. 1993). The FBI implemented the six-step pro-
cess in 1985. Id.
RFLP works as follows: (1) Pure DNA from the evidentiary samples is extracted
and purified with a chemical enzyme; (2) The DNA chain is then cut at specific loca-
tions with enzymes; (3) Through "gel electrophoresis," the "fragments of DNA are
separated by size within a gel." The separation occurs when the DNA fragments are
exposed to an electric field, which causes the larger fragments to move towards one
end of the gel more slowly than the smaller fragments; (4) The DNA fragments are
then transferred to a nylon surface in the same position they occupied in the gel; (5)
The nylon is then transferred to a bath containing a known DNA sequence labeled
with a radioactive isotope. The known DNA sequence, called a locus probe, binds to
the DNA to facilitate visualization; (6) Finally, the nylon is frozen between two pieces
of x-ray film to cause the radioactive material to decay and leave a "DNA print" on
the film. Id. at 43-44. Following this six-step process, analysts interpret the test re-
sults. Id. at 44.
101. Herrera & Tracey, supra note 10, at 238. A comparison of the size of the vari-
ous DNA fragments indicates a match or mismatch. Id. at 241. DNA evidence can
positively "exclude" a suspect but to "include" a suspect, there must be a calculation
of probabilities. Id.
For a detailed examination of the complex logical relationship between evidence
and probability, see A.J. AYER, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE (1972). "In many cases ...
we appear to run beyond our evidence: that is, we appear not to have a logical guar-
antee that even if our premises are true, they convey their truth to the conclusion."
Id. at 3.
102. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1195 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799 (2d Cir. 1992).
103. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1195; see also New Uses, supra note 98, at 56. One prob-
lem with DNA evidence is known as "DNA degradation." Herrera & Tracey, supra
note 10, at 242. Cells self-destruct upon their death causing all sub-cellular material,
including DNA, to break down. Id. This process reduces the amount of testable DNA
and may affect the size and quality of the fragments, thereby causing non-matching
patterns to erroneously occur. Id.
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state court system, the trend strongly favors admissibility."' The Sec-
ond, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits are the only federal courts to have ad-
dressed the admissibility of DNA fingerprinting."5 In each of these
three circuits, the court favored admissibility."6
2. Voice Spectrographic Analysis
Despite the controversy surrounding voice spectrographic analysis, a
growing number of jurisdictions allow the evidentiary technique in crim-
inal prosecutions.'" This technique identifies a suspect's voice by ana-
"Band shifting" is also a problem that occurs with DNA evidence. Id. at 243.
The exact cause of this phenomena is not entirely clear. See id. The process involves
slight variations in the shifting of corresponding DNA fragments from the evidentiary
sample during the gel electrophoresis phase. Id. See supra note 100 for an explana-
tion of gas electrophoresis. The phenomena causes difficulty in determining whether
or not a mismatch exists between two samples of genetic material. Herrera & Tracey,
supra note 10, at 243.
A third problem involving the accuracy of DNA fingerprinting centers on the
lack of appropriate statistical data bases. Id. at 243. It is important that a large
cross-section of individuals matching the Same ethnic and racial group as the suspect
were used in compiling statistical estimates. Id. The absence of a statistically sound
data base will most likely produce inaccurate DNA fingerprinting results. Id.
Finally, poor laboratory practices also produce inaccurate results. Id. at 244. To
obtain accurate results, laboratory technicians must work with materials subjected to
the same conditions. Id. Furthermore, a lack of standardized terminology and proce-
dures among the various laboratories often leads to miscalculations. Id. at 245.
104. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1195. See Herrera & Tracey, supra note 10, at 237. Half of
the California appellate courts that have addressed the appropriateness of DNA evi-
dence in the courtroom have held the technique to be inadmissible. Richard Barbieri,
Jury Still Out on DNA Evidence; Scientists' Ongoing Debate Over Genetic Evidence
Has Left Courts at Odds on Its Admissibility, RECORDER, Nov. 29, 1993, at 1; see J.
Michael Kennedy, DNA Clears Man Convicted of Rape, L.A. TIMES. Jan. 16, 1993, at
BI (discussing release of California man convicted of rape from the state penitentiary
following the DNA examination of a sheet, blanket and undergarments removed from
the crime scene).
105. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 786; see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir.
1993); see also Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1991.
106. In Martinez, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, according to the
standard of admissibility set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert. DNA finger-
printing is sufficiently reliable that future courts may take judicial notice of its accu-
racy. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1197. In Jakobetz, the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the
admissibility of DNA evidence. The court stated that extensive hearings on the admis-
sibility of DNA fingerprinting were unnecessary due to the technique's overwhelming
acceptance in the scientific community. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 799. In Bonds, the Sixth
Circuit applied the factors from Daubert and held that, although imperfect, DNA evi-
dence was helpful and admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Bonds, 12
F.3d at 563.
107. Elizabeth A. Gillis, Voice Identification by Spectrographic Analysis Admnissi-
ble-State v. Wheeler, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 264. 264 (1986); see also Sharon E.
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lyzing his peculiar mechanical and physiological characteristics."" The
technique is based on the principle that no two persons possess identi-
cal vocal cavities" and identical methods of manipulating the "lips,
teeth, tongue, palate and jaw muscles."" Furthermore, advocates of
voice spectrographic analysis contend that these unique physical and
mechanical characteristics cannot be effectively disguised."'
In creating a graphic representation of a person's speech characteris-
tics, known as a "voiceprint," laboratory technicians employ a spectro-
graph, which analyzes the time, frequency, and intensity of a speaker's
voice.12 The voiceprint reveals a pattern unique to the speaker that is
then compared to the speech pattern of the alleged perpetrator of the
particular crime."' Essentially, the task is to match the patterns pro-
duced from the various voice samples."
Gregory, Voice Spectrography Evidence: Approaches to Admissibility, 20 U. RICiI. L.
REv. 357 (1986).
108. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979). Allied forces developed voice spectrographic analysis during the
Second World War to identify the voices of enemy radio operators. Joseph R. Tybor,
Human Voice Identification Traps Criminals, CIII. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1988, at IOB: see
also Jerry Cohen, Voiceprints, L.A. TIMES, May 6. 1986, at 1; Walter H. Manning, Un-
derstanding Speaker Identification Techniques, TRIAL, Oct. 1981, at 62-63.
109. Vocal cavities include the throat, nose, and cavities existing in the mouth due
to the position of the tongue. Willians, 583 F.2d at 1196.
110. Id. at 1196-97. The lips, teeth, tongue, palate, and jaw muscles are collectively
referred to as "articulators." Id. at 1196.
111. Id..at 1197, Impressionist Rich Little failed to escape detection when disguising
his voice in a spectrographic experiment conducted at the Michigan State Police
Headquarters. Jerry Cohen, Voiceprints, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1986, at 1.
However, other tests demonstrate the difficulty of identifying the perpetrator of a
crime who has intentionally altered or disguised his voice. In two independent tests
of spectrographic analysis, experts correctly matched disguised voices only 23.3% and
21.6% of the time respectively. Brian R. Clifford, Voice Identification by Hunman Lis-
teners: On Earwitness Reliability, 4 LAW & HuM. BEIIAV. 373, 380 (1980). In a similar
study, the accuracy of the technique dropped from 95% to 30% when the test subjects
whispered instead of using a normal tone of voice. Id.
112. Reed v. Maryland, 391 A.2d 364, 366 (Md. 1978). The spectrograph imprints a
series of light and dark lines on electrically sensitive paper for examination by ex-
perts. Id.
113. Id. In Reed, a woman was brutally raped outside of her home. Following the
attack, police recorded seven phone calls to the woman by a man claiming to be the
assailant. James Reed was arrested for the attack and forced to submit to a voice
spectrographic analysis. Id. at 365.
114. Id. at 366.
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The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the admissibility
of voice spectrographic analysis. Although the technique remains con-
troversial, the majority of federal courts permit its use as evidence at
trial." ' Groups such as the National Institute of Justice, the United
States Secret Service and the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department
are currently cooperating to perfect the technique.""
3. Bloodstain Patterns
Prosecutors often present evidence of bloodstain patterns to prove a
criminal case."7 This evidentiary method is based on the principle
that, pursuant to the laws of physics, blood stains form in a uniform
manner."' By studying the size and shape of the blood pattern, the
source of the trauma to the victim and the subsequent course of events
can often be determined. ' 9
4. Firearms-related Evidence
State and federal courts routinely permit the scientific analysis of
115. Gillis, supra note 107; see United States v. Williams. 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d
Cir. 1978) (holding spectrographic analysis technique harbors a sufficient level of reli-
ability to admit in federal court); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463. 466-67 (4th
Cir.) (holding evidence produced by voice spectrographic analysis in bombing case
properly admitted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir.) (stating that voiceprint analysis is sufficiently accurate to admit
in court where defendants failed to produce witnesses testifying to the contrary),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
116. Cohen, supra note 108, at 1. The Secret Service is motivated to perfect current
methods of voice identification due to the large volume of threats made against pub-
lic officials. Id.
117. See, e.g., Idaho v. Rogers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Idaho 1991); United, States v.
Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992). In
Phillip, a prosecution for murder, the Sixth Circuit held that evidence of blood stain
patterns was properly admitted. Id. The prosecution introduced testimony of an FBI
expert on bloodstain patterns. Id. at 249. Using strings to chart the path of blood
droplets, the FBI official concluded that the pattern was typical of those resulting
from the beating of an individual. Id.
Using bloodspatter identification techniques. Connecticut criminal investigator
Henry C. Lee uncovered evidence proving the murder of a Hartford woman by her
husband, a prominent cardiologist. Robert Dvorchak, The Job is Marder-Solving
'PeiJect Crimes'; Forensics: Expert Uses Science and Technology to Unravel the Most
Baffling hiodunits, L.A. TIMES. March 29, 1992, at 2. From bloodstains in the
couple's bedroom. Lee calculated that the woman was bludgeoned and dropped to a
concrete driveway. Id.
118. Rogers, 812 P.2d at 1210.
119. Id. In Rogers, prosecutors sought to admit evidence of bloodstains to demon-
strate the victim's direction of travel after being shot in the head with a .357 mag-
num handgun. Id. at 1209-10.
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firearms-related evidence."l.O Lab technicians analyze bullets by identi-
fying characteristics unique to ammunition manufacturers"' and indi-
vidual firearms.'2 After recovering a bullet from a crime scene, techni-
cians fire a test bullet from the suspect weapon and compare the
two.':' In addition to evidence derived from the bullet itself, techni-
120. Paul C. Giannelli, The Twenty-First Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture, Sci-
entific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 137 MIL. L. REV. 167, 177 (1992).
Many investigations of firearms-related crimes involve the use of highly technical
scientific techniques. See Douglas DeGaetano, A Comparison of Three Techniques
Developed for Sampling and Analysis of Gunslot Residue by Scanning Electron
Microscopy/Energy-Dispersive X-Ray Analysis (SEM-EDX), 37 J. FORENSIC ScI. 281
(1992).
121. Bullet classification includes the analysis of the following characteristics: (1)
Bullets vary by "shape." Hollowpoint, flatpoint and roundnose bullets comprise the
most common shapes; (2) Bullets are "weighed" in grains; (3) Bullet "caliber" refers
to the measurement of its diameter; (4) "Cannelures" are knurled grooves on the
bullet's surface; (5) The "composition" of the bullet's metal is analyzed. 29 AM. JuR.
PROOF OF FACTS Firearnis Identification § 8 (1972) [hereinafter Firearms Identifica-
tion].
For an in-depth study of recent design configurations in handgun ammunition,
see Kris Sperry & Edwin Sweeney, Terminal Ballistic Characteristics of Hydra-Shok
Ammunition: A Description of Three Cases, 33 J. FORENSIC Sci. 42 (1988). One new
lethal innovation in commercial handgun ammunition involves the design of "frangi-
ble" bullets. Ed Sanow, A Look at Small Caliber Stopping Power, HANDGUNS 40, 44
(April 1993). Frangible projectiles rupture on impact and release a cone-shaped pat-
tern of birdshot pellets inside the target. Id. The frangible design greatly increases
handgun "stopping" power by inflicting multiple crush cavities in a human body. Id.
For example, a small .25 caliber frangible bullet produced 12 separate crush cavities
up to nine inches in depth when fired into test gelatin. Id.
122. Firearms Identification, supra note 121. For the characteristics used to identi-
fy a particular firearm, see id.
123. Firearms Identification. supra note 121, § 11. Firearms experts fire the sus-
pect weapon into traps filled with materials designed not to damage the test bullets.
Id.
Police investigators can chemically determine the type and diameter of a bullet
by chemical means when a thorough investigation fails to recover bullet fragments.
Pinchas Bergman, Bullet Hole Identification Kit: Case Report, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI 802,
802 (1987). By conducting a chemical spot test which reveals the presence of metals
and gun powder, investigators can detect bullet holes and reconstruct the trajectory
of a bullet's flight. Id.
When police recover only small amounts or fragments of a bullet, instrumental
neutron activation analysis (INAA) is often used to analyze them. Gerald Capannesi,
Bullet Identification: A Case of A Fatal Hunting Accident Resolved by Comparison
of Lead Shot Using Instrumental Neutron Activation Analysis, 37 J. FORENSIC SCI.
657, 657 (1992).
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cians can derive evidence from the distinct impressions on shell casings
that identify their model and manufacturer.
2
III. STATEMENT OF TIlE CASE
In the landmark decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc.," ' the Supreme Court resolved the split among the federal
circuits'0 regarding the foundational requirements for the admissibility
of scientific evidence.
In Daubert, two children, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, joined in
an action with their parents to recover damages for birth defects alleg-
edly caused by a Merrell Dow product.' The plaintiffs asserted that
the birth defects resulted from the mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, an
anti-nausea medication.'8
After successfully removing the case to federal court on diversity
grounds, -2 Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the plaintiffs would be unable to produce evidence proving that its
product caused birth defects.'"" Dr. Steven I. Lamm, a renowned phy-
124. Firearms Identification, supra note 121, § 14. For example, the impression left
by a Thompson submachine gun on its shell casings resembles a half-moon. Id.
125. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
126. For a discussion of the conflict among the circuits, see inf'ra notes 12-18 and
accompanying text.
127. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
128. Id. Jason was born missing a left hand and his left leg was shorter than his
right. High Court to Review Ex-pert-Witness Standards in Product Case. WASH. POST.
Oct. 14, 1992, at A6. Eric was born missing three fingers and with only half of his
right arm. Id. Bendectin has been used by more than thirty million women since
1956. $1 Million in Damages Awvarded to Deformed Girl in SE, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 1986, at B3. Beginning in 1980, the Food and Drug Administration required warn-
ings on all Bendectin labels stating that the medication should be taken only for the
most severe cases of nausea and vomiling. Id. Before the end of the 1980s. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ceased manufacturing the drug. Daubert, 727 F.Supp. at
571.
129. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
130. Id. Merrell Dow prevailed in 33 out of 35 previous cases in which it defended
against claims that Bendectin caused birth defects. Judges as Science Gatekeepers;
Supreme Court Ruling Allows Federal Judges More Leeway in Deteriniig Whether
or not Scientific Evidence may be Admitted, 244 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP.. July 5,
1993, at 7.
In its brief submitted to the Supreme Court, Merrell Dow asserted that Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence required a "community validation standard" for the
introduction of expert evidence. Brief for Respondent at Section i, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102). Merrell Dow argued
that the animal and chemical data relied on by the plaintiffs failed to conforn with
the standards of the contemporary scientific community. Id.
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sician and epidemiologist, stated on behalf of Merrell Dow that in his
expert opinion, use of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy
could not be shown to cause birth defects."' In response to Merrell
Dow's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs sought to introduce the
testimony of eight experts""' who concluded that Bendectin was in
fact a direct cause of birth defects."'
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment based
on its finding that the plaintiffs' evidence did not conform to the Frye
general acceptance test."' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
and affirmed the decision.' The court of appeals emphasized that in
light of the overwhelming weight of scientific data refuting Bendectin's
alleged toxicity, the plaintiffs' unpublished and unscrutinized reanalysis
of former studies was inadmissible to prove causation at trial. M"'
Recognizing the differing approaches to the admissibility of scientific
and expert opinion among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari to resolve the conflict.' 7 Writing for the majority of the
131. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791. Doctor Ltamn reviewed literature from thirty differ-
ent studies involving over 130,000 patients in reaching his conclusion. Id.; see also
Renee Cordes, High Court Takes Closer Look at EaT)ert Testimony, TRIAL, January,
1993, at 13.
132. Plaintiffs' experts possessed impressive credentials. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
Shanna Helen Swan received her master's degree in biostatics from Columbia Univer-
sity and her doctorate in statistics from the University of California at Berkeley. Id.
at 2792 n.2. Dr. Swan "is chief of the section of the California Department of Health
and Services that determines causes of birth defects, and has served as a consultant
to the World Health Organization. the Food and Drug Administration, and the Nation-
al Institutes of Health." Id.
Swan asserted that the Center for Disease Control's method for measuring birth
defects failed to account for many mothers exposed to Bendectin during their first
trimester of pregnancy. Swan claims that children with mothers who ingested
Bendectin during their first trimester of pregnancy held a "20% greater risk of birth
defects and an 80% to 90% greater risk of limb reductions . .. " Catherine Yang, Un-
der Attack: Testimony for ttire, Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 60.
133. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791. The experts based their opinions on "test tube"
and live animal studies linking Merrell Dow's product to birth defects. Id.
134. Id. at 2792. Essentially, the plaintiffs' experts based their opinions on data
taken from previous studies exonerating Bendectin as a cause of birth defects. Id.
The trial court concluded that since the "recalculations" of previous studies had not
been published or subject to peer review, no reasonable issue regarding causation
existed for the jury. Id.
135. I.
136. Id. at 2792.
137. Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized its reservations about admitting new and
unpublished evidence in light of the large body of published studies that strongly
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court, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Frye general accep-
tance test reigned as the preeminent standard for admissibility since its
inception seventy years earlier."' However, rather than deciding the
issue on the merits of the philosophical debate, the Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test."'
The Court underscored that the liberal standard of admissibility em-
bodied in Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 controls in all federal
litigation." Under the Federal Rules, all relevant evidence is admissi-
ble"' unless it unduly wastes time or confuses, misleads, or prejudices
the jury.' Justice Blackmun noted that in both the language and
formational history of Rule 702, which specifically addresses the admis-
sibility of expert testimony, the drafters refrained from mentioning the
long-standing general acceptance test for the admissibility of scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge."' Federal courts must now ad-
here to a more liberal standard of admissibility that relies on the ability
of the adversarial process to distinguish truth from falsehood."'
The Court stated that although the Federal Rules of Evidence super-
sede Frye, safeguards still exist to ensure that unreliable evidence is
screened."' The trial judge presides as "gatekeeper" to facilitate the
admissibility of relevant and reliable scientific testimony.' Applying
discredited the trustworthiness of reanalyzed epidemiological studies concerning
Bendectin. Id.
138. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792-93.
139. Id. at 2793. Before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both
statutes and case law guided the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal litiga-
tion. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984). Citing Professor Cleary, the Court,
noted that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, no federal common law remains.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Because the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the accompanying advisory notes did not mention the general acceptance test, the
Court found that the rules superseded the common law standard. Id.
140. Id. at 2793-94. For the text of Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, see
supra note 80.
141. FED. R. EVID. 402.
142. FED. R. EviD. 403. Due to the powerful and potentially misleading nature of
expert testimony, the trial judge must take greater care in balancing Rule 403 consid-
erations with expert, testimony than with that of lay witnesses. United States v. Marti-
nez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798).
143. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
144. Id. at 2798. The Court found Merrell Dow's pessimism regarding the capabili-
ties of the jury system was unfounded. Id. at 2798. Justice Blackmun wrote: "Vigor-
ous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence." Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas. 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
145. Doubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-98.
146. Id. at 2795. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the majority's asser-
tion that both relevancy and reliability are key to the admissibility decision. Id. at
2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
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Rule 702, the trial judge decides whether a particular scientific tech-
nique is based on "scientific knowledge"'4 7 and is helpful in determin-
ing a fact in issue."' According to the majority, the trial judge must
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in is-
sue."'"' The Court expressed its confidence that federal judges possess
the ability to fill such a role.""
The Court also set forth some general guidelines to assist federal
district court judges in determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence." t In essence, Daubert establishes a four-part test for determin-
ing the reliability of novel scientific techniques,''2 First, the court must
Rehnquist stated that Rule 702 placed federal judges in a gatekeeping function but he
did not believe that "it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to
become amateur scientists in order to perform that role." Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist. C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. "Scientific" connotes "a grounding in the methods
and procedures of science." Id. "Knowledge" is based on information derived from
known facts or from "any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as
truths on good grounds." Id. The court pointed out that although no certainties exist
in science, the "scientific knowledge" increases the reliability of evidentiary techniques
admitted in federal court. Id.
148. Id. at 2796. Blackmun noted that the helpfulness standard of Rule 702 "re-
quires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to ad-
missibility." Id.; see Michael A. Collora, Admitting Expert Testimony After 'Daubert':
Evidence, MASS LAW. WKLY., Aug. 30, 1993, at 11.
Throughout the process of determining admissibility, the district court judge
must ensure that improper evidence does not work its way into expert testimony.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Expert opinion based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay
must be based on data "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in performing opinions" pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Id. at 2797-
98. The trial judge must also remain ever mindful that, under Rule 403, the probative
value of any evidence must not be outweighed by other concerns which might taint
the fairness of the proceeding. Id. at 2798.
149. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. The preliminary assessment is made pursuant to
Rule 10 4(a). Id. Essentially, the court initially must make a two part finding: (I) that
any testimony advanced by the expert witness is a product of "scientific knowledge."
and (2) that any such evidence will be helpful to the trier of fact to determine a
material fact in the case. Id.
150. Id. at 2796. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed doubts that judges would "know
what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its
'falsifiability."' Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist. C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 2796-97.
152. Terence W. Campbell. The Daubert Decision And Its Effect on Expert Testihno-
ny; FRE 702 Is the Guideline For Admissibility, Micii. Lm'. WKiY., Sept. 13, 1993,
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evaluate whether a technique is based on a testable scientific theory.'"
Next, the court must decide whether the technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication.' Third, the court should consider the
potential rate of error of a given scientific method." ' Finally, the court
may consider the Frye general acceptance test as a tool of inquiry.'N
'
Thus, the legacy of the Frye decision survives in Daubert as one
element of the admissibility determination. 7 A judge may inquire into
a scientific technique's degree of acceptance within the appropriate
scientific community; however, he is not required to do so." Strong
support for a theory within the relevant scientific community indicates
a likelihood of reliability, whereas faint support properly brings its
trustworthiness into question." The Court noted that the focus of the
inquiry must be on the principles and methodology of a particular tech-
nique and not on the conclusions that naturally flow from it." '
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and re-
manded the case for further proceedings based upon the admissibility
guidelines set forth in Daubert."
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Practical Difficulties in Applying Daubert: Frye's Legacy Lives On
Although some legal scholars praise the decision to bar the "general
acceptance" standard in the federal trial courts," - the approach taken
at 5B.
153. Doaubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. Citing Popper, Justice Blackmun asserts: "Tile
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability." Id. at 2797.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Citing Professor Cleary, the Court noted that although the Federal Rules of
Evidence supersede the common law, the common law may assist to guide the court
in carrying out its designated powers. Id. at 2794.
157. Id. at 2797.
158. Id. The Court cites United States v. Downing: "A reliability assessment does
not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific
community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within
that community." United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.), offd, 780
F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
159. Doabert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2799.
162. Mark Frankel of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) stated that: "Any kind of scientific and technical information should be
grounded in the methods and procedures that are used by scientists to determine
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by the Supreme Court is likely to lead to inconsistent results." Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion underscored the "flexible" approach to
federal admissibility questions in the Daubert opinion." This flexibili-
ty may prove problematic as trial courts attempt to reconcile the liberal
spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence" with the court's gatekeeping
role in assuring reliability."
reliability and validity." John D. Cox, Judges Get More Latitude Over Scientific Testi-
mony, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 29, 1993, at A7. The new guidelines given by the Court
to help evaluate scientific evidence also pleased the general counsel of the American
Medical Association, Kirk Johnson. Charles Marwick, Court Ruling on "Junk Science"
Gives Judges More Say About What Expert Witness Testimony to Allow, 270 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 423, 424 (1993).
163. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "countless ... questions" will arise when
the multitude of federal judges attempt to apply the guidelines set forth in Daubert.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Legal specialists are generally in disagreement about what effects Daubert will
have. Cox, supra note 162, at A7. Michael Horowitz, an advocate of tort reform, and
Cynthia Cwik, an environmental attorney, both want a more definitive standard that
would lessen the discretion of individual trial judges. See id.
164. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. "The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we empha-
size, a flexible one." Id.
165. Id. at 2794; see Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)
(discussing the "spirit of liberality animating the Federal Rules"); United States v.
Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 553, 557 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that DNA evidence meets the
requirements of "liberal Rule 702" as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Daubert);
United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1340 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that courts must
keep Sixth Amendment concerns in mind when dealing with hearsay testimony in
"the liberal spirit basic to the Federal Rules of Evidence"); Gentile v. County of Suf-
folk, 129 F.R.D. 435, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Together Rules 401 and 402 express the
federal policy underlying the federal rules, which favors liberal admission of evi-
dence"), affd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Sixth Circuit decision in the post-Daubert case of United States v. Bonds,
12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993), illustrates the deference that some courts may give to
the liberal spirit inherent in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Bonds, the court stat-
ed that the "trial court is to use 'great liberality' in evaluating the scientific founda-
tion of expert testimony. Id. at 566. The defendant challenged the statistical accuracy
of DNA evidence provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 551. The
FBI originally calculated that the likelihood that the defendant ,did not commit the
alleged crime was 1 in 270,000, but later conceded that the figure could be as low as
1 in 35,000 (the defense claimed 1 in 17). Id. Even in light of this evidence, the
Sixth Circuit concluded, "it is irrelevant that the FBI's DNA matching and statistical
techniques are still being refined or that the results produced may not be wholly
accurate." Id. at 565-66.
166. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (stating that Rule 702 assigns the trial judge the
duty of ensuring the relevance and reliable foundation of expert testimony). In reality,
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Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent that although the majori-
ty found that the Federal Rules superseded any common law applica-
tion of the general acceptance standard, the majority went on to set
forth its own guidelines in dicta that exceeded the scope of the
rules.'67 Thus, the reliability guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court
conflict with the liberal spirit of the Federal Rules.cs Chief Justice
Rehnquist further noted that the Federal Rules speak to "relevancy""f
in determining admissibility and not to "reliability."'70 Although the lan-
disparate results arise from flexible guidelines due to the differing priorities and legal
interpretations held in the diverse judicial community. Thomas W. Kirby, Putting
Experts Under Scrutiny, N.J. L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at 296. Thomas Kirby, an author and
Washington D.C. attorney, states that "Uludges are human, and the flexible and dis-
cretionary standards that Daubert mandates unavoidably threaten inconsistency and
invite arbitrariness and sloppiness." Id.
Pursuant to the Daubert decision, new programs have been initiated to develop
the ability of federal jurists to assess the reliability of scientific evidence. Ruth
Gastel, Product Liability Tort Reform, INS. INFO. INST. REP., Nov. 1993 [hereinafter
The Liability System]. For example, The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technol-
ogy, and Government and the Federal Judicial Center implemented a training program
for federal district court judges in the state of New York. Id.
167. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Rule 702
does mandate some form of "gatekeeping function," but nothing to the extent put
forth by the majority. Id.; see Thomas W. Kirby, Junk Science and The Trial Judge,
TEX. LAW., Aug. 2, 1993, at S-4 (stating that Daubert drew "creatively" on the lan-
guage of Rule 702) [hereinafter Junk Science and the Trial Judge].
Some court observers critical of the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Stevens argue that had the justices prevailed, it would have been a major set-
back to the effort to keep "junk science" out of the federal trial courts. Thomas W.
Kirby, Matching Procedure To Policy; An Enhanced Role For Trial Judges And Clos-
er Scrutiny Of The Rational Underpinnings Of Theoretical Evidence Will Stop Junk
Science From Flooding The Courts, RECORDER, Aug. 30, 1993, at 6 [hereinafter
Matching Procedure to Policy].
168. The majority acknowledged that the Federal Rules contain a "liberal thrust" de-
signed to relax "traditional barriers" to admissibility. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (cit-
ing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
169. Pursuant to Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "'[rlelevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
170. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority derived the "reliability" re-
quirement by manipulating the language of Rule 702. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist was
joined by Justice Stevens in his opinion. Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an ex-
pert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EViD. 702.
The majority interpreted the rule to contain a "scientific ... knowledge" require-
ment in which proposed testimony must be based on what is known or "accepted as
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guage of Rule 401 does seem to mandate some measure of reliability for
an evidentiary offering,'71 the Daubert majority's interpretation of Rule
702 imposes a higher admissibility hurdle than that provided by the
Rules. "72
The "testability" and "error rate" guidelines for determining the ad-
missibility of evidence based on scientific theory demonstrate the
Daubert court's expansive reading of Rule 702."73 Commenting on how
trial courts should determine testability, Justice Blackmun cited schol-
arly writings indicating that a judge might look to empirical tests and
the falsifiability of a technique.'' Along with the falsifiability of a sci-
entific method, the judge may inquire into its known rate of error."5 In
his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist chided this approach as an attempt
to transform federal judges into amateur scientists.' 6 Operating under
the Daubert court's flexible standard, some federal judges may improp-
erly read such guidelines to impose a "high standard of reliability"'7
for the admissibility of scientific techniques. Ironically, federal judges
who interpret Daubert as mandating a high degree of reliability may
transform Rule 702 into a test that is even more restrictive and conser-
vative than Frye's general acceptance standard.'78
Other federal judges may interpret Daubert as imposing a less exact-
ing role for the trial court in determining whether evidence is sufficient-
ly grounded in scientific methodology. In defining "scientific knowl-
edge," Justice Blackmun wrote that "'knowledge' connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation."'" The opinion further
truths on good grounds." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. According to the majority, a
standard of evidentiary reliability emanates from this requirement of "scientific knowl-
edge" in Rule 702. Id.
171. See Richard M. Lorenzen, Comment, Voice Spectrogram Analysis: A Case of
False Elimination, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 217, 233.
172. Any item offered into evidence to prove the existence of a fact of consequence
under Rule 401 would logically need to possess some measure of reliability to render
the occurrence of that fact more probable or less probable.
173. "Ordinarily, a key question . . . is . . . whether it can be (and has been) test-
ed." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
174. Id. at 2796-97.
175. Id. at 2797.
176. Id. at 2800.
177. See Judges Affirmed As Gatekeepers of Expert Testimony in Civil Cases, BNA
CAL. ENV'T DAILY, Aug. 2, 1993 (stating that scientific evidence must meet a high
standard of reliability following Daubert).
178. See Campbell, supra note 152, at 5B ("[A] careful review of Daubert indicates
that it may be a more demanding standard than Frye).
179. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. Justice Blackmun defines evidence grounded in
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states that the validity of the scientific principles underlying an innova-
tive method need not be "known" to a certainty." However, the court
failed to demonstrate how a trial judge may determine whether an ex-
pert derives the basis of his testimony from what is "known.
'
18
Operating somewhere between the parameters of unsupported specula-
tion and certainty, judicial interpretation of such a flexible standard will
surely vary greatly among judges."u In deference to the liberal spirit of
the Federal Rules, some trial judges might adhere to the general princi-
ple that "the search for truth is furthered by permitting witnesses with
material and relevant information to testify at trial, leaving judgment
about the testimony's credibility to the fact finder.""
Another possible misapplication of Daubert involves the Court's pres-
ervation of the general acceptance standard, albeit in a diminished
role."u Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun stated that trial
judges may consider the common law doctrine when determining the
reliability of a novel scientific method.' Justice Blackmun then de-
clared that "'a known technique that has been able to attract only mini-
mal support within the community' may be properly viewed with skepti-
cism." Since Frye existed as the premier standard for the admissibil-
ity of novel scientific techniques during most of the twentieth centu-
ry,"7 many judges may naturally still accept the merits of the test.
Common sense dictates that when a trial judge with no scientific or
technical background is confronted with detailed statistics pertaining to
the falsifiability or error rate of a novel technique," he or she might
scientific knowledge as essentially that which can be inferred from a set of "known"
facts or ideas or that which is well established as truth. Id. at 2795 (citing Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986)); see United States v. Martinez, 3 F.2d
1191, 1196 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734 (1994) ("the subject of scien-
tific testimony does not have to be known to a certainty").
180. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
181. Matching Procedure to Policy, supra note 167, at 6.
182. Junk Science and the Trial Judge, supra note 167, at S4; see also Jeffrey
Kanige, Subtle Changes Expected in Wake of Evidence Ruling, N.J. L.J., July 12, 1993,
at 5 (noting that the "results under Daubert will vary greatly from judge to judge").
183. Christine M. Dolfi, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-Constitutional Right of a
Criminal Defendant, 27 DUQ. L. REv. 119, 132 (1988).
184. Daubert, 113 . Ct. at 2797.
185. Id. "Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evi-
dence admissible." Id.
186. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.), affd 780
F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985)).
187. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1233.
188. During oral arguments for the Daubert case, Chief Justice Rehnquist hotly re-
sponded to a Harvard Law School professor presenting the merits of the drug
manufacturer's case. Timothy M. Phelps, Testimony of Experts Is Debated, NEWSDAY,
March 31, 1993, at 16. Rehnquist challenged the professor, saying: "You know, you're
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logically fall back on Frye's general acceptance standard to make the
critical decision.'P
By designating "peer review" as one of the four most important con-
siderations for determining reliability, Justice Blackmun bolstered the
ability of Frye's proponents in the federal judiciary to indirectly rely on
the common law standard.' Under Frye's standard, any technique
meriting the label of "generally accepted" would naturally have been
subjected to the rigors of "peer review and publication. ' .. Thus, two
of the four factors named by Justice Blackmun, general acceptance and
peer review, constituted the core of the former standard under Frye."
Justice Blackmun emphasized the importance of peer review when he
a lawyer, you're not a doctor. Here you are telling me this is so, but how do I
know?" Id.
189. Discussing the difficulty of determining reliability, Judge Edward Becker of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "Itlhe difficulty of establishing a standard for
reliability explains the popularity of the Frye test, which, despite its drawbacks, is
easy to apply." Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, Is the Evidence All In?: A Pro-
posal for Revising the Federal Rules, 78 A.B.A. J. 82, 85 (Oct. 1992); see also Michael
Hoenig, Computer Simulations and Other Weapons, N.Y. L.J., March 8, 1993, at 3
(expressing concern that judges might be unprepared to assess the reliability of com-
puter-generated evidence); David 0. Stewart, A New Test: Decision creates uncertain
future for admissibility of expert testimony, 79 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (Nov. 1993) (quoting
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried of the University of California at Davis School of
Law: "One of the reasons Frye survived so long is that judges and lawyers were
comfortable with it, since it liberated you from having to determine the reliability of
scientific evidence").
190. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. "Another pertinent consideration is whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication." Id.
191. See People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 724 (1993) (demonstrating the
important connection between subjection to peer review and a determination of gen-
eral acceptance). For example, one California court denied the admissibility of DNA
evidence subsequent to a review of scientific publications regarding its statistical
reliability. Id. "The courts view such writings as evidence . . . [of a technique's ac-
ceptance] in the scientific community." Id.
192. Students of the law quickly realize the prevalence of "balancing tests" in decid-
ing many of the key issues in American jurisprudence. Here, one-half of the elements
set forth were critical in making a "general acceptance" determination under Fbrye. Al-
though Justice Blackmun commented on the nonexclusivity of the list, most courts
will undoubtedly concentrate on the factors put forth by the Daubert court. See Por-
ter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 615-16 (7th Cir. 1993) (analyzing the reliability
of scientific evidence pertaining to ibuprofen using only the four factors set forth by
Daubert); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1993) (examining
the four factors set forth by Daubert). Clearly, the Daubert opinion creates a possible
outlet for those federal judges wishing to preserve the legacy of Frye.
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stated that "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a
component of 'good science.'"" When taken together with his asser-
tion that techniques attracting only minimal support from scientific
experts "may properly be viewed with skepticism,""' it is clear that a
federal judge might properly cull through the available scientific publi-
cations and give significant weight to the numerical breakdown of those
opposed to and those in favor of a particular method. When presented
with complex data in a pre-trial hearing that both supports and opposes
a scientific technique, it is doubtful that a judge favoring the Frye ap-
proach will "go against the grain" of any consensus existing in the sci-
entific community.95
The crowded dockets of the federal district courts" may also con-
tribute to trial judges giving the general acceptance element undue
weight in deciding questions of admissibility. Since federal trial court
judges operate under severe time pressures, their ability to adequately
sift through reams of technical material is greatly hindered.'7 Thus,
when operating under the flexibility of the Daubert framework, the
combined pressures of time and highly technical evidence might push
many federal judges back the general acceptance standard.
Despite the potential for inconsistency, the possibility exists that
Daubert will lead to the admissibility of scientific evidence that has
193. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The majority denied that "peer review" exists as a
prerequisite for admissibility. Id. The majority posited that some reliable techniques
go unnoticed or are too new and thus escape publication. Id. However, after reading
Daubert's analysis of the importance of peer review as an element of "good science,"
the likelihood that a trial judge will strike out on his own to declare unpublished
scientific principles reliable decreases. Id.
194. Id. at 2797.
195. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens belittled any attempt by federal
judges to become amateur scientists. Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). During oral argument of the Daubert case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist also implicitly challenged the ability of legal experts to render their own
conclusions on the propriety of highly technical evidence. See Timothy M. Phelps,
Testimony of Experts Is Debated, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1993, at 16.
196. See Cris Carmody . . . While Rehnquist Sings Caseload Blues, CIII. 138 DAILY
L. BULL., No. 24, Feb. 4, 1992 (stating that federal trial judges are unable to give
timely and adequate attention to their civil caseloads due to the explosion in criminal
drug and domestic violence laws).
197. Junk Science and the Trial Judge, supra note 167, at S-4. Both judges and
attorneys must now attempt to educate themselves in scientific theory. Jeffrey Kanige,
Subtle Changes Expected in Wake of Evidence Ruling, N.J. L.J., July 12, 1993, at 5.
The pace of litigation could be slowed by intense pretrial motions involving highly
technical evidence and volumes of documents. Id.; see also Allison R. Hayward, Junk-
ing the Law; If Scientists Can't Agree on the Merits of Technical Evidence, How
Can the Supreme Court Expect the Law to do Any Better, RECORDER, July 20, 1993,
at 11 ("Juries and judges can be easily confused by well-credentialed experts who
report opposite opinions").
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traditionally been excluded and the denial of evidence previously admit-
ted in many courts.'" When inquiring into admissibility questions, the
judge must focus on the technical soundness of the principles and
methodologies underlying the scientific technique and not the conclu-
sions generated by them." Since a lack of general acceptance is no
longer fatal, proponents of a relatively unknown scientific technique
might successfully demonstrate that its underlying methodologies and
procedures are sufficiently grounded in "good science."' On the other
hand, scientific techniques that have long been admitted under a gener-
al acceptance guideline may no longer pass Daubert's reliability thresh-
old."I Although the true impact of the decision may not be known for
years to come, many experts wonder how controversial evidentiary
techniques will fare in post-Daubert decisions.2
198. Stewart, supra note 189, at 50.
199. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. This consideration determines whether the expert's
testimony is the product of scientific knowledge or unsupported speculation. O'Conner
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 92-2989, 1994 WL 3794, at *14 (7th Cir., Jan. 7,
1994); see Matching Procedure to Policy, supra note 167, at 31 ("[T]he trial judge is
to ensure that the jury starts with good scientific information . . . ").
200. Matching Procedure to Policy, supra note 167, at 8. The growing controversy
involving electromagnetic fields (EMFs) demonstrates Daubert's potential impact on
industries whose detractors utilize scientific theories that have not yet gained general
acceptance. See Scott H. Strauss, The Big Uncertainty Over EF; Does Exposure to
Electromagnetic Fields Pose a Health Hazard?, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1993, at 20.
Some health groups argue that high levels of exposure to EMFs greatly increases the
risk of leukemia, tumors, and lymphoma. Id. at 21. However, experts are currently
divided over the scientific evidence produced by epidemiologic and other studies. Id.
at 21-22. Regardless of the lack of general acceptance, the scope of expert evidence
admitted in EMF cases may be substantially broadened by the Daubert decision. Id.
at 23.
Those who oppose the elimination of the Frye test also point to the fiasco in-
volving "cold fusion" in 1989 as another example of why a general acceptance stan-
dard is necessary. Hayward, supra note 197, at 11. According to Allison Hayward of
the Political Economy Research Center, the claims, eventually proven false, involving
the discovery of a new atomic energy source points to the merits of the Frye test.
Id. The false cold fusion findings were announced without the scrutiny of peer re-
view by two University of Utah scientists. Id. Hayward asserts that had Daubert been
in place in 1989, the faulty evidence of cold fusion would have been admitted since
the process of peer review that necessarily accompanies general acceptance would
not have been required. Id. at 21.
201. Matching Procedure to Policy, supra note 167, at 8.
202. Stewart, supra note 189, at 50.
1419
B. The Need for Change: An Argument for a Dual
Standard of Admissibility
Although the general impact of Daubert will not be known for some
time,' Congress and the federal judiciary must act to change the stan-
dard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Constitutional and poli-
cy considerations exist that justify a dual standard of admissibility for
criminal and civil cases. The historical debate regarding the merits of a
"conservative" and "liberal" admissibility standard has been misguided.
In fact, a conservative test best serves the primary societal interest in
civil cases, namely the economic well being of the Republic,"4 while
the implementation of a liberal standard of admissibility for criminal
defendants would best accommodate the nation's historical, philosophi-
cal, and constitutional concerns regarding the administration of jus-
tice.'
1. Civil Cases: The Economic Necessity of Frye
Economic and social policy considerations merit the adoption of a
conservative standard of admissibility for scientific evidence in the
federal court system." Amendment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence to reflect Frye's general acceptance test in civil cases is a
necessary step in controlling the negative economic impact of meritless
and costly litigation. 7 Such an amendment would place a premium on
the reliability of any scientific theory utilized as the basis for pulling a
business entity into time-consuming and expensive litigation.2'
203. Id.
204. The Use And Misuse of Expert Eridence In The Courts, 77 JUDICATURE 68, 68
(1993).
205. See Steven G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Prog-
eny of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 139 (1983).
206. See Max Boot, Chorus of Reformers Adds New Pitch, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 25, 1994 [hereinafter Chorus of Reformers].
207. Out of concern for the societal costs of high-stakes litigation, the Bush Admin-
istration recommended to the American Bar Association in 1991 that "expert testimo-
ny must be based on established theory supported by a 'significant' number of ex-
perts in the field." The Liability System, supra note 166. In fact, President Bush is-
sued an executive order in 1992 directing federal litigators to only seek the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence that conforms to Frye's general acceptance requirement.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Abolish the 'Tye' Test, 12 APR CAL. LAw. 63, 63 (1992).
208. As an example of the high cost of litigation to American corporations, Cessna
Aircraft Company spends approximately $25 million per year in legal fees. Chorus of
Reformers, supra note 206. Boston attorney Peter Pucloski noted that even in suc-
cessfully defended aviation suits, legal defense fees of one million dollars are not
uncommon. Id.
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In civil cases, a liberal standard of admissibility impacts consumers
by increasing the costs of goods and services. 2" The high cost of liti-
gation for American manufacturers amounts to a "litigation or liability
tax" on domestically produced products20 since these manufacturers,
along with the providers of health care and other services, pass the cost
of litigation onto individual consumers.' When combined with the po-
tency of strict liability claims in defective product cases,"2 a liberal
209. This concern led former Vice-President Dan Quayle, while chairman of the
President's Council on Competitiveness, to push for the adoption of the Frye test in
all American courts. Imwinkelried, supra note 207, at 63.
210. See Liability Bill Gets Bipartisan Support; Group of US Senators Proposes
Uniform National Product Liability Law, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., April 5, 1993, at
5 (stating products liability reform legislation would "relieve consumer of the 'liability
tax' they now pay on every item they buy") [hereinafter Liability Bill Gets Bipar-
tisan Support]; Unwarranted Litigation Inhibits Investment, Slows Job Growth, Says
Lackritz, President of Securities Industry Association, PR NEWSWIRE, July 21, 1993
(quoting the president of the Securities Industry Association who blames civil litiga-
tion for the imposition of a "litigation tax").
For an excellent analysis of the financial costs of the current legal system, see
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LIABIITY FAIR-
NESS ACT, S. REP. No 102-215, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
211. See James H. Andrews, Injury Lawsuits Said to Cause Financial Crisis For
Many US Companies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1994, at 11. For example, one-
half of the price paid by high school athletic departments for football helmets is
associated with the manufacturer's legal expenses. Id. at 12; see also The Liability
System, supra note 166, at 3 (noting that legal expenses make up 17% of the cost of
a ladder).
The medical profession incurs extremely high litigation costs. James Driscoll &
William Summers, What We Need Is Real Tort Reform-Not Snake Oil, Health Care:
Despite What the Clintons Say, It's Legal Fees, Not Drug Prices, 7hat Are Too High,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at B7 (stating that "[dioctors spend $10 billion a year on
malpractice insurance"). The cost of medical malpractice insurance to the nation's
practitioners exceeds the total profits of the largest American drug companies and
the funds designated for the research of Alzheimer's disease, AIDS, and cancer. Id. A
comparison of drug prices between American and foreign companies evidences the
impact of high legal transaction costs on the American public. Id. The average price
of drugs purchased from an American company is 30% higher than that of the same
drug in Germany. Id.
212. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIlE LAW OF TORTS
§ 98, at 692 (5th ed. 1984). Beginning in the 1960s, American courts eased the move-
ment away from warranty and negligence causes of action by allowing more potent
strict liability claims. Id. The policy behind allowing strict liability causes of action
stems from the notion that manufacturers are in the best position to absorb the fi-
nancial ramifications of unsafe products. Id. at 692-93. Essentially, strict liability theo-
ry entails a "risk spreading" approach in which manufacturers transfer the pecuniary
cost of product related injuries to the American consumer. Id. at 693.
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standard of admissibility is increasingly burdensome to both manufac-
turers and consumers. Furthermore, many economic and business lead-
ers contend that the productivity and competitiveness of American
companies in the global marketplace is compromised by exorbitant
transactional costs.
2 1 3
In addition to raising the price of products, a liberal admissibility
standard contributes to the outright denial of valuable goods and servic-
es to the American consumer."4 Critics assert that innovative products
necessary for the treatment of AIDS, kidney disorders, and other disor-
ders have not been introduced due to fear among manufacturers of
being haled into court on meretricious legal claims." ' According to
Senator Slade Gorton of Washington, litigation negatively affected
American business in the amount of $117 billion in 1989 alone.1 6
An examination of the drug Bendectin, the subject of the Daubert
litigation, demonstrates the need for a conservative admissibility stan-
dard in civil cases.27 Although a small number of Bendectin users did
give birth to deformed children, defenders of the drug claim that the
plaintiffs lack proof of a causal nexus in light of the thirty-three million
women who used the product over a twenty-seven year period to pre-
vent morning sickness."8 Even though many jurisdictions have ac-
knowledged the weakness of the reanalyses evidence on which
Bendectin cases rest,219 Merrell Dow incurred massive litigation costs
and eventually pulled the drug from the market despite repeated vindi-
cation in court.2 1 In effect, American women are now denied the only
213. Andrews, supra note 211, at 11.
214. See Joseph Calve, Bringing Back Bendectin: A Tort Reform Morality Tale,
CONN. L. TRw., Oct. 25, 1993, at 1 (illustrating the financially motivated removal of a
prescription drug from the market despite unsuccessful challenges to its safety in
court).
215. See Andrews, supra note 211, at 12 (citing negative impact on AIDS research);
Liability Bill Gets Bipartisan Support, supra note 210, at 6 (discussing the discon-
tinuation of a drug designed to prevent the spread of AIDS from mothers to their
children and the development of an improved dialysis machine).
216. Liability Bill Gets Bipartisan Support, supra note 210, at 5.
217. See Calve, supra note 214, at 2.
218. Id. at 1-2.
219. Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding
summary judgment in favor of defendant manufacturer as a result of the weak scien-
tific basis for Bendectin cases). Prior to the Danbert decision, Merrell Dow "pre-
vailed" in all 33 of its previous Bendectin cases. Judges As Science Gatekeepers; Su-
preme Court Ruling Allows Federal Judges More Leeway In Determining Whther Or
Not Scientific Evidence May Be Admitted, 244 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., July 5,
1993, at 7. However, one jury awarded an astounding $95 million verdict against 'the
company, which later was reversed on appeal. Calve, supra note 214, at 3.
220. In addition to negative publicity, Merrell Dow incurred legal fees in the range
of $100 million defending Bendectin cases. Calve, supra note 214, at 3.
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remedy to prevent morning sickness, with the exception of "soda crack-
ers and hot tea." "n
The use of liberal admissibility guidelines in cases involving complex
scientific theories increases the likelihood that a jury might render a
favorable verdict for the plaintiff despite the lack of an adequate show-
ing of causation."z According to a 1985 report commissioned by the
Attorney General, "The use of... invalid scientific evidence (commonly
referred to as 'junk science') has resulted in findings of causation which
simply cannot be justified ..... " Many observers claim that once
suspect scientific theories make their way into the courtroom, the con-
test comes down to a "battle of the experts. " 4 Unfortunately, juries
are often pulled sympathetically toward injured plaintiffs despite proper
proof that the defendant caused the injury.22 5
221. Id. at 2. However, Frederick Lamb, former counsel to Merrell Dow and a be-
liever in Bendectin's safety, would like to bring the product back under a different
brand name. Id. at 1, 4. Lamb had no problem with his own daughter taking
Bendectin during her two pregnancies at the height of the product liability litigation.
Id. at 8. Since the discontinuation of the product, the hospitalization rate for women
suffering from vomiting and nausea during pregnancy has increased two-fold. Id. at 8.
222. See Paula Span, The Man Behind the Bitter Pill Debate; Lawyer Leonard Finz
Presses the Case Against Eli Lilly and Prozac, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1991, at Cl, C8.
223. John M. Kobayashi, Too Little, Too Late: Use and Abuse of Innocuous Yet
Dangerous Evidentiary Doctrines, C607 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1127, 1152 (1991).
224. See id. at 1152; see also Span, supra note 222, at 8 (citing a Brookings Insti-
tute source who claims: "Unless the plaintiffs locate a 'smoking gun' document, as in
the Dalkon Shield litigation, 'it'll be a battle of the experts. It's whoever the jury
believes'"). The increasingly lucrative market for expert witness testimony raises ques-
tions of reliability in the minds of many court observers. See Catherine Yang, Under
Attack: Testimony for Hire, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 18, 1993, at 60. For example, one
Merrell Dow defense expert received a $500,000 payment for his services in the
Daubert case. Id. at 62. Shanna Swan, an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Daubert,
earned "$175 an hour for consulting and $275 an hour for testifying." Id. at 61.
225. Calve, supra note 214, at 2; see Span, supra note 222, at 8 ("juries are heavily
influenced by the bleeding-heart factor"); Paul Miller & Bert Rein, 'Expert' Testimony:
When Is It Admissible?, TEX. LAW., April 5, 1993, at 20, 23 (stating that the conse-
quence of subjecting lay jurors to complex litigation that is beyond their ability to
comprehend amounts to "a form of redistributive relief largely divorced from the
actual merits of any given lawsuit"). A recent decision in Riverside, California, evi-
denced the sympathy and anger that juries often vent against corporate defendants.
See -Joseph Perkins, Courtroom Casinos; Juries are Dealing Out Absurdly Huge
Awards, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 21, 1994, at B-5. Reacting to a $89-million ver-
dict against Health Net for denying insurance coverage to a cancer patient, attorney
Steven Meadville said that the decisions was "[o]utrageous, inconsistent and rendered
entirely on the basis of emotion." Id.
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The potential for inconsistent results from Justice Blackmun's flexi-
ble guidelines in Daubert' may contribute to the current system's
negative impact on business and consumer purchasing power. Tort
reform advocates argue that a strict and predictable test would best
serve America's business interests.27 Unpredictable outcomes often
cause manufacturers to steer away from the introduction of new prod-
ucts due to the expense of potential litigation.22
2. Criminal Cases: The Need For a Liberal Standard of Admissibility
Constitutional, historical, and philosophical principles merit special
consideration in developing the standard of admissibility for scientific
evidence in criminal actions. Because criminal prosecutions involve the
potential deprivation of life and liberty,29 a liberal standard of admissi-
bility is justified for relevant "' evidence offered by the accused. The
need for leniency in admissibility questions increases with the impor-
tance and exculpatory quality of the evidence to the defense.'
226. See supra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
227. See Cox, supra note 162, at A8. One expert from the Manhattan Institute in
New York labeled the Daubert decision a "chilling blow to small business particular-
ly." Id.
Advocates of tort reform argue for a number of other systemic changes as well.
They are currently pushing for legislation that "abolishes joint and several liability for
non-economic damages." The Liability System, supra note 166, at 1. Other changes
advocated in the current system include a heightened standard of proof to obtain
punitive awards damages. Id. However, other tort reform advocates seek to lessen
litigation costs by pursuing alternative forms of dispute resolution (ADR). See Liabili-
ty Bill Gets Bipartisan Support, supra note 210, at 6. For commentary on alternative
forms of dispute resolution, see also Jerome Facher, The 1992 Superior Court Bench-
Bar Conference: A Model For the 90's, MAss. L. WKLY., Sept. 27, 1993, at S4; Ray Wil-
liams, Corporate Minitrials 1i-eserve Relationships, N.J. L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at 10;
Robert Zampano, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Movement Whose Time Has
Come, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3.
228. See Liability Bill Gets Bipartisan Support, supra note 210, at 6.
229. The Bill of Rights illustrates the necessity of providing greater protection for
criminal defendants than civil defendants. For example, the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "[T]ruth' and 'justice'
are flexible concepts and must differ in civil and criminal cases to accommodate the
fundamental societal interest in certainty about the reliability of a criminal convic-
tion." D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treat-
ment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASHl. L. REV. 289, 290-
91 (1989). -1
230. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence. the relevancy requirement is easily satis-
fied. See Rule 401, supra note 169.
231. See Steven G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Prog-
eny of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 13940 (1983).
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Justice Powell once wrote that "[tlhe dual aim of our criminal justice
system is 'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.'111 2 In a free
society, tension clearly exists between the right of government to exert
its legitimate police powers and the right of the individual to be free
from arbitrary interferences with personal liberty.' As a result of the
unique American historical journey," the nation's founders struck the
balance in favor of criminal defendants." Concurring in the 1970 deci-
sion of In re Winship, 6 Justice Harlan expressed the American desire
to ensure the greatest possible protection to criminal defendants when
he stated that a "fundamental value determination of our society" rests
232. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975).
233. H. FRANK WAY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1 (1980). The
landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), illustrates the Court's attempt to
strike a balance between the right of the individual and the prerogatives of the state.
In Tery, the Supreme Court recognized that evidence seized by the police in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment should not be admitted at trial. Id. at 12; see also
Albright v. Oliver, 62 U.S.L.W. 3624 (1994) (commenting on the Fourth Amendment's
connection with the "liberty deprivations that go hand in hand with criminal prosecu-
tions").
234. The framers of the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights built upon
the history and traditions of their English heritage. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 530 (1884). Working from the principles imposed upon the English monarchy in
the Magna Carta, the founding fathers composed a written constitution designed to
protect the rights of the people from the abuses of government power. Id. at 531.
Thus, the framers of the United States Constitution reached a much different con-
clusion than other nations in selecting the means for controlling the criminal element
inherent to all societies. See id.
235. The framers struck a deliberate imbalance in favor of criminal defendants
based on the societal ideal that "an individual's liberty interest transcends the state's
interest in obtaining a criminal conviction." Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt
Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) (citing In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). The impetus for this imbalance undoubtedly stems
from the traditional Anglo-American distrust of authoritarian governmental practices.
See In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948). Historical examples of oppressive gov-
ernment action in the European experience include: the Spanish Inquisition, the Eng-
lish Star Chamber and the French lettre de cachet. Id. at 268-69. Two historical prob-
lems in the realm of law enforcement involve "enforcement error" and "enforcement
abuse." Randy E. Barnett, 14 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 615, 616 (1989). The Sixth
Amendment right to a compulsory process in criminal proceedings emanated from the
founders' distaste for the English common-law denial of a defendant's request to pro-
duce witnesses in his behalf when tried for a felony or treason. Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
236. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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on the notion "that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free.""7
a. Constitutional arguments supporting the liberal admission of
exculpatory scientific proof for criminal defendants
The Supreme Court decisions of Chambers v. Mississippi,' Wash-
ington v. Texas," and their progeny present a compelling constitu-
tional argument for the right of a criminal defendant to present a broad
spectrum of exculpatory evidence in his defense. The Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments extend criminal defendants the right to intro-
duce exculpatory scientific theories at trial-even those theories that
carry a significantly reduced indicia of reliability than that required by
Daubert.240 This line of cases demonstrates that, when considering
both constitutional and public policy concerns, the state and federal
rules of evidence require amendment to reduce the reliability threshold
for any evidence that is critical to the defense of the accused.
The Sixth Amendment encompasses the rights necessary to afford a
fair and complete trial to criminal defendants.24 Fundamentally critical
to the American system of fairness and justice, these rights are guaran-
teed to the citizenry by the principle of due process.4 2 Deriving their
237. Id. at 372.
238. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
239. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
240. See Churchwell, supra note 231, at 140 (stating that if anything can be taken
from Washington and Chambers it is the principle that "a judge cannot keep impor-
tant yet possibly unreliable evidence from the jury").
241. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
242. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In 1868, Congressional Radical Republicans se-
cured the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the states from abridging
Fifth Amendment guarantees. THIE SUPREME COURT & THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 3
(John Galloway, ed., 1973). See also Albright v. Oliver, No. 92-833, 1994 LEXIS 1319
(U.S. Jan. 24, 1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing due process rights in other
areas not specified by the Bill of Rights); Kloppfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
223 (1967) (holding the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial is a fundamen-
tal right); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (declaring that "a provision of
the Bill of Rights which is fundamental and essential to a fair trial is made obligato-
ry upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment").
Those fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights are also protected from
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authority from the principle of "fundamental fairness," courts of appel-
late review may develop appropriate constitutional guidelines for the
administration of criminal justice."
In Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether criminal de-
fendants possess the right to introduce the testimony of any witness on
their behalf.2 4 Defending against a charge of murder, the defendant
asserted that two Texas statutes barring the testimony of his accom-
plice at trial violated the Sixth Amendment."5 Texas defended the poli-
cy on the ground that the state's interest in avoiding the taint of per-
jured testimony outweighed Washington's right to present favorable
witnesses."' Chief Justice Warren responded that the specific Sixth
Amendment guarantees equate the right of the accused to present a
defense to his "own version" of the facts."7 In deciding for Washing-
ton, Chief Justice Warren underscored the relevant and crucial nature
of the excluded evidence to the defense.48
Following the Washington line of reasoning, the Supreme Court in
Chambers held that a Mississippi trial court unconstitutionally prevent-
ed the defendant's introduction of important hearsay testimony. 9 The
abusive state action through the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
243. See Graham v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993).
244. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1976). The court also considered wheth-
er the defendant could compel their attendance in court. Id.
245. Id. at 14-17. Dallas County officials charged Washington for the murder of an
18 year-old man. Id. at 15. Admitting his presence at the crime scene, Washington
sought to call the actual gunman as a witness. Id. at 16. Despite the value of the
testimony to Washington's defense, two Texas statutes barred defendants from pre-
senting the testimony of an accomplice in their behalf. Id. at 17. The policy goal
behind the statutes originated from the belief that co-participant testimony is inher-
ently untrustworthy and subject to perjury. Id. at 21.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 19; see Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating
that due process of law entails the right of a criminal defendant to present his own
defense witnesses).
248. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23. The court found that the arbitrary nature of the
Texas law failed constitutional scrutiny. Id. Although the Court limited the decision
to essentially arbitrary state action, the case demonstrates the position held by rele-
vant and exculpatory evidence in the constitutional arena. See id. at 23 n.21.
249. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). Mississippi officials
prosecuted Chambers for the murder of a police officer during a chaotic melee. Id.
at 285. The trial court barred Chambers from admitting the testimony of another
man, Gable McDonald, who confessed to the murder on four different occasions. Id.
at 289.
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trial court decided that the common-law "voucher rule" and general
prohibition against hearsay testimony barred Chambers from admitting
the statements of Gable McDonald who had confessed to the crime on
four different occasions.2" The court found that although Mississippi
did not recognize the "declaration against penal interest" exception to
the hearsay rule, other guarantees of trustworthiness existed concern-
ing McDonald's prior statements. " ' Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell stated that "where constitutional rights directly affecting the
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be ap-
plied" to mechanically bar the introduction of evidence critical to the
defense. 2
Despite the state's legitimate interest in excluding hearsay testimo-
ny,2" the critical nature of the evidence played a key role in motivat-
ing the Chambers court to find a violation of the defendant's consti-
tutional rights." Similarly, the exculpatory value of scientific evidence
is often critical to the vindication of a criminal defendant who is faced
with a daunting web of circumstantial evidence spun by the prosecu-
tion. Although a trial court may question the reliability of hearsay or
scientific or other crucial evidence, the balance25 must be struck in fa-
vor of the criminal defendant. -'
250. Id. at 292-95. The court denied Chambers' request to cross-examine McDonald
as a witness based on the antiquated common-law "voucher rule," which stated that
.a party who calls a witness 'vouches for his credibility.'" Id. at 295.
251. Id. at 302. Mississippi only recognized declarations against pecuniary interests
as an appropriate exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 299. The general purpose of
the hearsay rule in all jurisdictions is to prevent the trier of fact from being tainted
by untrustworthy evidence. Sharlow v. Israel. 767 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1985). Oppo-
nents of the declaration against penal interest exception assert that it allows perjured
testimony to enter into the trial process. Baker v. Florida, 336 So. 2d 364, 367 (Fla.
1976).
The Chambers court discussed factors indicating the trustworthiness of the out-
of-court declarations: First, the statements were spontaneous and made to a close ac-
quaintance. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300. Second, each of the statements were indepen-
dently corroborated by other evidence. Id. Third, each of the statements was diamet-
rically opposed to McDonald's interests. Id. at 300-01. Fourth, McDonald was available
for cross-examination at trial. Id. at 301.
252. Id. at 303.
253. Id. at 302 (noting that "perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected
or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say").
254. Id.
255. Lee v. Kolb, 738 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (discdssing the balance
between the state's interest in carrying out rules of procedure with the defendant's
need to present a defense).
256. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
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The Supreme Court further expanded the Sixth Amendment right of
criminal defendants to present crucial evidence in Rock v. Arkansas.'
In Rock, the high court held that Arkansas' per se ban on post-hypnotic
testimony violated the defendant's constitutional right to testify in her
own behalf.' 8 Despite the unreliability of hynpotically enhanced testi-
mony," the court stated that the inaccuracies of the process can be
reduced by the traditional safeguards of cross-examination and caution-
ary instructions to the jury."''
Like Washington and Chambers, the Supreme Court demonstrated in
Rock that the constitutional right of a defendant to present favorable
evidence at trial may override the state's interest in screening evidence
that lacks a significant indicia of reliability.26 ' Although the Rock court
conceded the unproven and suspect quality of hypnotically produced
evidence," it recognized that an overriding purpose behind the pas-
sage of the Sixth Amendment was to facilitate the admissibility of fa-
257. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
258. Id. at 62. Charged with the murder of her husband, the defendant put forth a
claim of self-defense. Id. at 46. However, since she had repressed the events leading
up to the shooting, her attorney suggested that she undergo hypnosis to refresh her
memory. Id. After two sessions of hypnotic treatment by a licensed neuropsycholo-
gist, the defendant remembered that although she did not have her finger on the
trigger, the gun went off following a struggle with her husband. Id. at 47.
259. Id. at 59. Justice Blackmun noted that hypnosis often distorts the recollection
of a witness. Id. According to Blackmun, the subject is likely to "confabulate" by
embellishing the sequence of events to enhance his credibility and by reinforcing both
true and untrue memories. Id. at 60.
260. Id. at 61. Other ways of ensuring trustworthiness include: conducting the hyp-
notic interview in a neutral setting, videotaping the session, and utilizing a profes-
sional in the field. Id. at 60.
261. Id. at 52. However, the court did not recognize the right of a criminal defen-
dant to present testimony carte blanche. The right of the criminal defendant in this
regard may occasionally bow to legitimate state concerns in implementing their rules
of evidence. Id. at 55-56.
262. Id. at 60. The inability of juries to assess the credibility of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony leads most jurisdictions to disfavor it. Kevin R. Casey, Hypnotically
Refreshed Testimony and the Balancing Pendulum, 1985 U. ILL L. REV. 925 (declar-
ing problems involving hypnosis include "questionable reliability, ineffective cross-ex-
amination, witness-credibility concerns, an undue scientific aura, and misleading juror
misconceptions"). For a discussion of the impact of Rock, see Louis M. Holscher, The
Legacy of Rock v. Arkansas: Protecting Criminal Defendants' Right To Testify In
Their Own Behalf, 19 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 223 (1993); Carolyn
E. Moller, Comment, The Courts' Reaction to Rock v. Arkansas: The Admissibility of
a Witness's Testimony After He Has Been Hypnotized, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 559
(1992).
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vorable defense testimony at trial.2" Thus, Sixth Amendment concerns
may override the state's interest in suppressing evidence bearing the
potential taint of unreliability.2" Following this line of reasoning, other
scientific evidentiary techniques merit jury consideration when relevant
and critical to the accused's defense.M
In light of the constitutional concern for the rights of the accused,
Washington, Chambers, and Rock demonstrate that criminal defendants
deserve the lowest possible admissibility threshold for exculpatory evi-
dence." Although "any" evidence might not be proper for consider-
ation by the trier of fact, 7 the perception of justice and the integrity
of the American adversarial system depends on full disclosure of facts
at trial.2" As stated by one district court judge, "'It is for [the jury],
generally, and not for appellate courts, to say that a particular witness
spoke the truth or fabricated a cock-and-bull story."'2  At the very
least, trial court judges should give the accused the benefit of the doubt
by bending the admissibility threshold beyond its normal limitations."'
263. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 54; see United States v. Davis, 974 F.2d 182, 186 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (recognizing the Sixth Amendment power to "call any material and favor-
able witness").
264. Although the Supreme Court focused on the arbitrary nature of the Arkansas
statute, the underlying policy behind the Rock ruling originates from the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 54-55.
265. The Rock court emphasized the negative impact of the lower court's ruling on
the accused's efforts to defend herself. Id. at 57. Preventing the defendant to testify
in her own defense due to the potential taint of hypnotically refreshed testimony
denied her the opportunity to describe her version of the facts. Id.
266. However, many courts resist an expansive reading of Chambers. Churchwell,
supra note 231, at 144. In fact, the Chambers court expressly confined its decision to
the facts of defendant's case, stating: "[W]e establish no new principles of constitu-
tional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally
accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own ....
procedures." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973).
But despite this limitation, the Chambers decision has evolved into a potent
weapon for criminal defendants who assert that critical defense evidence was improp-
erly excluded at trial. Churchwell, supra note 231, at 139; see Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964, 970 (3rd Cir. 1980) (stating that a grant of immunity may be necessary
"if realistic meaning is to be given to a defendant's due process right to have excul-
patory evidence presented to the jury").
267. For example, courts must still retain the right to exclude evidence based on
Rule 403 grounds. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
268. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988); United States v. Enoch, 581 F.
Supp. 423, 430 (N.D. I11. 1984).
269. United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 439 (E.D. Vir. 1984) (quoting United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15 (1980)).
270. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 252 (1987).
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b. Beyond the Constitution: policy considerations for a liberal
standard of admissibility for criminal defendants
American notions of justice dictate that evidentiary standards refrain
from undermining the fundamental principle that those accused of a
crime remain innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.27' The de-
sign of the criminal trial reflects the traditional concern for safeguard-
ing the rights of the criminal defendant. For example, the prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt emanates from the Ameri-
can notion that an "individual's liberty interest transcends the state's
interest in obtaining a criminal conviction."72 Accordingly, Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to reflect a split
standard of admissibility that favors scientific evidence proffered by
criminal defendants.2
The Federal Rules for the admissibility of character evidence provide
guidance for revising Rule 702. The admissibility standard for character
evidence is based on the notion that criminal defendants deserve advan-
tages at trial to adequately defend themselves against the "all powerful"
state. 4 Therefore, Federal Rule 404(a) clearly embodies an admissibil-
ity standard favoring criminal defendants. 5 The rule prevents the
271. Sundby, supra note 235, at 458. Scholars debate the actual origin of the pre-
sumption of innocence. Justice White argued that the principle developed from the
Biblical writings found in the book of Deuteronomy. Francis D. Doucette, The Pre-
sumption of Innocence, CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 23, 25.
272. Sundby, supra note 235, at 457-58. In the case of In Re Winship, the common
law doctrine reached a level of constitutional acceptance. 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
The Winship court declared that the fact that "guilt in a criminal case must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt ... [stands among] historically grounded rights of
our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions . .. ."
Winship, 397 U.S. at 362; see Louis B. Schwartz, 'Innocence'--A Dialogue With Pro-
fessor Sundby, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1989) (reviewing Professor Scott Sundby's views
on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence).
273. For the current text of the Federal Rules of Evidence 702, see supra note 170.
274. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1991).
275. According to Rule 404(a):
CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.
Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion, except:
CHARACTER OF ACCUSED.
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same; CHARACTER OF VICTIM.
(2) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime of-
fered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-
state from introducing circumstantial evidence of a defendant's poor
character because of the concern that a jury might convict him for past
acts or behavior rather than on the merits of the prosecution's case."6
However, although character evidence brings the potential taint of unre-
liability with it, policy concerns dictate that the defendant may "open
the door" for its introduction."r
Similar to the rules of character evidence, criminal defendants merit
the chance to present critical and exculpatory scientific evidence to the
jury. Although relaxed admissibility standards for criminal defendants
carry with them the possibility of injecting unreliable evidence at
trial,"8 policy concerns support the necessity of taking such systemic
risks.27 As with character evidence,28 the prosecution would still
possess the ability to attack the weight of scientific testimony proffered
dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor ....
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), (2).
276. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988). When the defendant's
character stands as an element of the crime, or is "in issue," the state may then take
the initiative in proffering character evidence at trial. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory
committee's note. However, the prosecution may not take the lead in introducing "cir-
cumstantial" evidence of character to suggest "an inference that the person acted on
the occasion in question consistently with his character." Id.
277. See United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also
Huddleston, 584 U.S. at 686 (explaining the concern that "the jury may choose to
punish the defendant for the similar rather than the charged act, or the jury may
infer that the defendant is an evil person").
278. The underlying purpose of Frye's stringent "general acceptance" test centered
on the court's desire to keep unreliable evidence from the jury. Frye, 293 F.2d at
1014.
279. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
The "rape shield" doctrine of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 illustrates another
example of public policy affecting the amendment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743, 1747 (1991). Rule 412 generally bars a crimi-
nal defendant from introducing evidence of a rape victim's past sexual behavior. FED.
R. EVID. 412. The policy behind the doctrine centers on the concern that some jurors
might abuse evidence of past sexual conduct by blaming the victim for the act com-
mitted against her. Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS. SERV.,
Sept. 18, 1990 (presenting the testimony by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman in
Justice Souter's confirmation hearings). Although Rule 412 reflects meritworthy public
policy goals, Justices Stevens and Marshall implied in their dissent in Lucas that,
comparatively, the right to present witnesses in one's own defense is even more
critical. Lucas, III S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
280. The prosecution possesses the ability to cross-examine and discredit a
defendant's character witnesses like any other witness at trial. Lewis, 482 F.2d at
638. On cross-examination, the prosecutor may even inquire into specific instances of
conduct to test the true knowledge of the defendant's character witness. FED. R.
EVID. 404(b).
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by the defendant with its own experts and with the potency of cross-
examination."'
A comparative look at the current hearsay exceptions further demon-
strates the reasonableness of the proposed amendment to Rule 702.
Stronger policy arguments exist for allowing juries to consider a broad-
er spectrum of scientific evidence than those that justify the exceptions
to the general rule barring hearsay testimony.82 In White v.
Illinois," the Supreme Court underscored that certain "firmly rooted"
exceptions to the hearsay rule "carry sufficient indicia of reliability to
satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the" Sixth Amendment.2"
According to the Court, "firmly rooted" exceptions are those that are
sufficiently grounded in the history and traditions of Anglo-American
jurisprudence." Examples of firmly rooted exceptions include sponta-
neous declarations,2" dying declarations,2 t statements made in the
course of receiving medical care,' and co-conspirator statements.8
281. In all likelihood, the proposed amendment of Rule 702 will still allow the ad-
mission of more reliable evidence than the current character rules. For example,
Federal Rule of Evidence 405 limits the means of proving character evidence at trial
to "testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion." FED. R.
EVID. 405(a). It is difficult to imagine what could be more prone to inaccuracy or
untrustworthiness than a witness testifying to the defendant's general reputation in
the community.
282. According to the Federal Rules, "hearsay is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The principle reason for bar-
ring hearsay testimony flows from its lack of trustworthiness. DAVID F. BINDER, HEAR-
SAY HANDBOOK 127 (3d ed. 1991).
283. 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 n.8 (1992).
284. Id. Although the Sixth Amendment's "Confrontation Clause generally requires
that a declarant either be produced at trial or found available before his" hearsay
statement may be admitted, firmly rooted exceptions supposedly bear independent
guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 741-42; see United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770,
775 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the constitutional requirements for the admission of
hearsay testimony).
285. See White, 112 S. Ct. at 736. Statements that do not fall within the firmly root-
ed exception must demonstrate "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Flores,
985 F.2d at 775.
286. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743 n.8. A spontaneous declaration pertains to "a state-
ment relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event." Id. at 740 n.l.
287. Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
288. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742.
289. Bourjally v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). American jurisdictions have
accepted co-conspirator admissions for over 150 years in the United States. Id.
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An examination of the firmly rooted dying declaration exception to
the hearsay rule, for example, demonstrates how potentially unreliable
evidence may be admitted under the current rules. Under Rule
804(b)(2), a "statement made under belief of impending death... [iun a
prosecution for homicide ... concerning the cause or circumstances of
what the declarant believed to be impending death" qualifies as a valid
exception to the hearsay rule.' ° However, the origins of ihis excep-
tion call into question the logic of the firmly rooted exception doctrine.
Dying declarations stem from the pronouncement by English judges
that reliability in such circumstances is guaranteed because one hearing
the "beating of the wings of the Dark Angel" would not "willingly go to
meet his Maker with a lie upon his lips."29" ' In actuality, the true moti-
vation of the English courts lay in their desire to hang murderers, de-
spite actual knowledge that such statements lack any guarantee of reli-
ability.2" Regardless of the high court's deference to the deep histori-
cal roots of the doctrine, logic dictates that such an exception often
leads to the admissibility of untrustworthy and blatantly false state-
ments."
Other data calls the admissibility of excited utterances into question
under the firmly rooted exception.2"' Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2)
describes an excited utterance as: "A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition, or immediately thereafter.""u Despite the excite-
ment produced by some events, questions arise regarding the accuracy
of a declarant's perception when subject to extreme degrees of
stress.2" In addition to problems of perception, difficulties often arise
in determining whether the statement occurred sufficiently close in time
to the stressful event." Clearly, such a rule is subject to manipulation
and abuse.
Yet, despite the potential for unreliable testimony to come in under
the hearsay exceptions, the courts defer to historical precedent and
290. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
291. IRVING YOUNGER, HEARSAY A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET 155 (1988).
292. Id.
293. See id.
294. See THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 241 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1972) (discussing the
distorting effects of stress on witness testimony) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF THE AC-
CUSED].
295. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
296. See RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, supra note 294, at 241.
297. See YOUNGER, supra note 291, at 144-45 (stating "[ijf the intervening time is so
long that the influence of the event would have worn off, then the guarantee of reli-
ability is lost").
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allow the admissibility of such evidence.2" The most disturbing conse-
quence of potentially unreliable hearsay evidence is its use by the pros-
ecution to convict the accused.2" Similarly, it is difficult to imagine
that exculpatory scientific evidence brought to the attention of the jury
through the testimony of an expert witness could be any less reliable
than questionable hearsay evidence. Furthermore, the proposed amend-
ment to Rule 702 would only permit a liberal admissibility standard of
scientific evidence when dealing with the accused. As a result, the pro-
posed amendment for scientific evidence would more closely reflect the
traditional concerns for the protection of the criminal defendant than
the current hearsay exceptions.3"
V. CONCLUSION
During the twentieth century, American courts have hotly debated the
appropriate standard for the admissibility of novel scientific tech-
niques."' Although the Supreme Court intended to end the controver-
sy among the federal courts in Daubert, the guidance given by Justice
Blackmun will inevitably lead to inconsistent results among the federal
circuits.' The flexibility allotted to trial judges by Daubert will be
problematic as they attempt to reconcile the liberal spirit of the Federal
Rules of Evidence3" with their new "gatekeeping" role in assuring reli-
ability.-
Rather than settling on Frye's conservative general acceptance test or
a more liberal admissibility standard, constitutional and public policy
concerns merit the amendment of Federal Rule 702 to reflect a split
standard of admissibility." Economic considerations merit the appli-
298. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 n.8 (1992).
299. YOUNGER, supra note 291, at 185.
300. See supra notes 282-99 and accompanying text.
301. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232-37 (3d Cir.), affd, 780 F.2d 1017
(3d Cir. 1985).
302. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
(Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "countless questions" will arise when federal
judges attempt to implement the Daubert guidelines).
303. Id. at 2794; see Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (dis-
cussing the "spirit of liberality animating the Federal Rules").
304. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (stating that Rule 702 assigns the trial judge the
duty of ensuring the relevance and reliable foundation of expert testimony).
305. See supra notes 203-300 and accompanying text.
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cation of Frye's conservative general acceptance guidelines in all civil
cases." Constitutional, historical and public policy concerns merit a
relaxed admissibility threshold for criminal defendants when scientific
proof is particularly exculpatory and necessary to a successful de-
fense. °  Over time, society is best served by evidentiary standards
that preserve the economic integrity of the Republic while simulta-
neously safeguarding the rights of the accused.
WILLIAM P. HANEY, III
306. See The Liability System, supra note 166.
307. See supra notes 229-300 and accompanying text.
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